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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Pragmatism in Constitutional Law
During hearings on the Davie Shipbuilding appeal' in 1976, the Cana-
dian Supreme Court judges encountered a perplexing difficulty. It arose
from evidence filed in the case: there were 123 volumes of evidence and
no place to put them.
Stacked in the law clerk's quarters, nine sets of evidence (1107
volumes) blocked radiator heat; the clerk of process had not shelf space
enough by half, and more materials arrived daily; moving the evidence
about to find suitable storage created a manpower problem. Reading the
evidence presented the most formidable challenge of all.
Although Davie Shipbuilding holds the record for most evidence filed
in Supreme Court history, it is not unique. Davie Shipbuilding and like
cases indicate a distinct change in the functions of modem courts. From
tribunals of pure law, the courts have become largely tribunals of fact (or,
in the case of appellate courts, interpreters of statutes). This increased
concentration on factual findings has greatly slowed the pace of the courts.
At the beginning of the nineteenth century Lord Ellenborough disposed of
twenty cases a day; Lord Abinger somewhat later heard six or seven. By
contrast, two is a job well done in any modem court;2 the Supreme Court
of Canada averages 1.2 cases per day. Among the many reasons for this
are the complexity and detail that factual issues present. A second reason is
that factual material has to be appreciated against an elastic legal standard.
The tribunal has to decide whether, in a tort case, the facts indicate reason-
able conduct in the circumstances, or if, on construction of a particular
contract, the facts amount to breach. To an increasing extent legal standards
must be developed out of the case's individual particulars. Unlike the legal
certainties of the nineteenth century, twentieth century justice has become
personalized, or, more philosophically, pragmatic.8
Constitutional law in Canada has been remarkably resistant to this
trend. Factual issues have been rare. Legal standards tend to the general;
rarely has their articulation depended on individual facts and circumstances.
Stare decisis, until very recently,4 has held.
If one surveys constitutional cases decided in the last ten years, it
becomes apparent that things are changing here as well. Factual evidence
1 Davie Shipbuilding Ltd. v. Cargill Grain Co., [1978] 1 S.C.R. 570, 91 D.L.R. (3d)
661.
2 Atiyah, From Principles to Pragmatism: Changes in the Function of the Judicial
Process and the Law, An Inaugural Lecture Delivered Before the University of Oxford
on 17 Feb. 1978 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978) at 14.
RId. at 15. Professor Atiyah's monograph, P.S.A., first drew the author's attention
to this point.
4 McNamara Construction (Western) Ltd. v. The Queen, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 654, 75
D.L.R. (3d) 273; Reference re Agricultural Products Marketing Act (1978), 19 N.R.
361, 84 D.L.R. (3d) 257 (S.C.C.).
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was produced in impressive quantities in several cases.5 What makes the
point even clearer is that the Supreme Court has adopted the practice of
specifically calling for factual evidence in constitutional law decisions. 6 The
best example of this trend is presented by an Irish case, Ryan v. The
Attorney General.7 In the Ryan case a claim of constitutional infirmity was
asserted against an Act of the Oireachtas, 8 which provided for compulsory
fluoridation of public water supplies. It was said that the Act was obnoxious
to the plaintiff's constitutional right of bodily integrity. The Court sifted
through a formidable mass of technical data in order to ascertain whether
fluoridation in fact involved risk to life of the citizenry or any special class
of them. The Court had to weigh conflicting expert technical briefs and
testimonies, and it is apparent that the Court undertook the task without
the slightest hesitation and, perhaps, with a certain relish. The Irish Supreme
Court gave a ruling based on the state of scientific knowledge then proved,
and allowed that the constitutionality of the Act again could be called into
question if and when scientific developments and knowledge changed. Ryan
is the perfect example of a constitutional ruling that anticipates variation
according to the circumstances. It illustrates in the starkest terms the move-
ment toward a constitutional law tailored to individual facts, a personalized
or pragmatic public law jurisprudence. 10
5 Reference re Agricultural Products Marketing Act, id.; Reference re Anti-Inflation
Act, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373, 68 D.L.R. (3d) 452; CIGOL v. Gov't of Sask., [1978] 2
S.C.R. 545, 80 D.L.R. (3d) 449; Central Canada Potash Co. v. Gov't of Sask., [1979]
1 S.C.R. 42, 88 D.L.R. (3d) 609.
6 In In re the Board of Commerce Act, 1919, [1922] 1 A.C. 191 at 196, 60 D.L.R. 513
at 515 (P.C.), Viscount Haldane records how when the constitutional case was first
stated by the Commerce Board for opinion of the Supreme Court, the Court "took the
view that the case was defective, inasmuch as it did not contain a statement of concrete
facts, out of which such questions arose." A fresh case had to be stated. In Reference re
Anti-Inflation Act, id., the Court gave directions that factual data be produced by
counsel in the facta, and procedures were specified for replying to the data. See also
A.G. Man. v. Man. Egg and Poultry Ass'n, [1971] S.C.R. 689, 19 D.L.R. (3d) 169;
Kruger v. The Queen, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 104, 75 D.L.R. (3d) 434, 34 C.C.C. (2d) 377;
and Montcalm Construction Inc. v. Minimum Wage Comm'n (1979), 25 N.R. 1, 93
D.L.R. (3d) 641 (S.C.C.).
7 [1965] I.R. 294 (Sup. Ct.).
8 Health (Fluoridation of Water Supplies) Act, 1960; and Fluoridation of Water
Supplies (Dublin) Regulations, 1962, S.I. 1962, No. 75.
9 The Constitution of Ireland, 1937, does not create, by its terms, a right to bodily
integrity. What it does create are certain fundamental rights. The plaintiff sought to spin
out of the cluster of personal rights enumerated in art. 40(3) the specific right to bodily
integrity.
lo Ryan, supra note 7, is not unique. Cases have arisen under the Australian con-
stitution in which the constitutional ruling varied as the facts changed: see Armstrong
v. State of Victoria (No. 2) (1957), 99 C.L.R. 28 (H.C. of Aust.); and Commonwealth
Freighters Pty. Ltd. v. Sneddon (1959), 102 C.L.R. 280 (H.C. of Aust.). Professor
Lane, Facts in Constitutional Law (1963), 37 Aust. L.J. 108 at 118, explains the Aus-
tralian position this way:
A statute is passed on the basis of certain facts; when these facts change, the Act
becomes inoperative or unconstitutional; and the court could be made aware of
this change by the presentation of evidence.
1980]
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B. Implications of Pragmatism
All of this has great significance to constitutional law in general and to
the presumption of constitutionality in particular. Constitutional questions
are shifting off the axis of grand abstract disputes respecting who, as between
federal and provincial governments, has exclusive constitutional jurisdiction
over some immense field of law-making such as labour relations,"1 language 12
or interprovincial trade.'3 More precise and discrete questions are being
asked. The new orbit for constitutional litigation has a factual centre. The
questions more typically are as to whether, as a matter of fact, a particular
piece of challenged legislation unduly interferes with legitimate interests of
the coordinate level of government or with the individual's fundamental
freedoms. 14
The change suggests that The British North America Act, 1867,11 will
be seen to contain a much larger reserve of concurrent powers than here-
tofore has been the case. The doctrine of exclusive legislative powers will
wither and decay. Abstract domains of law-making, in which one or the
other level of government exclusively is competent, are giving up ground
to factual disputes as to whether a particular challenged law bears a reason-
able connection to an asserted head or catalogue of powers.
This is a development which in the paramountcy machinery of our
constitutional law already has been completed. Our courts, in contrast to
those of the United States' 6 and Australia,' 7 now refuse to supersede pro-
vincial law for mere abstract or theoretical conflict with an allegedly para-
mount federal statute. There must be "operating incompatibility" in the
sense that compliance with a provincial statute implies breach of a federal
statute in the particular circumstances.1 8 That is preeminently a question of
fact. As Mr. Justice Beetz put it in Montcalm Construction Inc. v. Minimum
Wage Commission:
11 Toronto Electric Comm'rs v. Snider, [1925] A.C. 396, [19251 2 D.L.R. 5 (P.C.).
12 Jones v. A.G.N.B., [1975] 2 S.C.R. 182, 45 D.L.R. (3d) 583.
'3 Citizens Ins. Co. v. Parsons (1881), 7 App. Cas. 96, 1 Cart. 265 (P.C.).
14 Montcalm Construction, supra note 6, converts a labour relations jurisdictional
dispute into a question of fact; CIGOL, supra note 5 (per Dickson J., dissenting), treats
a trade and commerce jurisdictional dispute as an issue of fact; Kruger, supra note 6,
turns a constitutional issue respecting Indian land claims into an issue of fact; and in
Man. Egg and Poultry Ass'n, supra note 6, Laskin J. lamented the absence of facts in
the constitutional question presented.
15 30& 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.).
'IPennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 76 S. Ct. 477 (1956); California v. Zook,
336 U.S. 725, 69 S. Ct. 841 (1949).
'7 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1900, 63 & 64 Vict., c. 12, s. 109
(Aust.); Ex parte McLean (1930), 43 C.L.R. 472 at 483 (H.C. of Aust.): Inconsistency
"depends upon the intention of the paramount Legislature to express by its enactment,
completely, exhaustively, or exclusively, what shall be the law governing the particular
conduct or matter to which its attention is directed. When a Federal statute discloses
such an intention, it is inconsistent with it for the law of a State to govern the same
conduct or matter."
18 Smith v. The Queen, [1960] S.C.R. 776 at 800, 25 D.L.R. (2d) 225 at 246, 128
C.C.C. 145 at 167-68, per Martland J.; Mann v. The Queen, [1966] S.C.R. 238, 56
D.L.R. (2d) 1, [1966] 2 C.C.C. 273; Ross v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, [1975] 1
S.C.R. 5, 42 D.L.R. (3d) 68, 14 C.C.C. (2d) 322; Bell v. A.G.P.E.L, [1975] 1 S.C.R.
(VCOL. 18, NO. 1
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Montcalm ... argues in its factum that the federal Act... "may" differ [in its effects]
from those of provincial law. That is not good enough. Montcalm had to prove
that federal and provincial law were in actual conflict for the purposes of this
case.19
Federal states seem to be characterized by two stages in their consti-
tutional history. In the first stage, federalist disputes-grand jurisdictional
battles between central and local governments-characterize the early lives
of most federal states. There is, one supposes, a certain inevitability about
this largely because of the generality of language characteristic of constitu-
tional documents. Stage two is a later development characteristic of older
federations. The United States offers the worthiest example. Federalist dis-
putes occur much less frequently. The courts already have done their work;
the more obvious questions are resolved. Within the judicially elaborated
constitutional structure, concurrent access to law-making fields is the rule
rather than the exception. In constitutional jurisprudence, attention shifts to
protecting the citizen from governments rather than protecting one level
of government from the other. Canada is entering this second phase of her
constitutional history.2 0
If this view of the direction of our constitutional law is correct, certain
propositions follow respecting the proper posture to be taken by the courts
in federalist disputes. First, the judges positively should refrain from search-
ing for the "true meaning" of the constitution. That approach leads to the
drawing of neat but academic jurisdictional lines. By drawing impermeable
borders around abstract legislative fields, such rulings encourage jealousy
on the part of the "proprietor" government over its turf. The opportunity
for jurisdictional tension or conflict is increased. Nothing is gained in the
actual litigation. The more profitable inquiry is whether or not the particular
challenged law is sustainable.
Second, the courts positively should eschew a priori or abstract theories
of constitutional incompetence. The search for object and purpose or a
fictitious legislative intent can be a remarkably unhelpful analytical exercise.
25, 42 D.L.R. (3d) 82, 14 C.C.C. (2d) 336; Monicalm Construction, supra note 6. See
generally, Laskin, Occupying the Field: Paramountcy in Penal Legislation (1963), 41
Can. B. Rev. 234; Lederman, The Concurrent Operation of Federal and Provincial Laws
in Canada (1963), 9 McGill L.J. 185; and Strayer, "The Flexibility of the B.N.A. Act,"
in Lloyd and McLeod, ed., Agenda 1970: Proposals for a Creative Politics (Toronto:
Univ. of Toronto Press, 1970) at 197.
l9 Supra note 6, at 15 (N.R.), 661 (D.L.R.). It has been settled law for many years
that the burden of proving conflict for paramountcy purposes is on the party asserting
it: A.G. Can. v. A.G. Que., [1943] Que. K.B. 543, rev'd on other grounds, [1947] A.C.
33 (P.C.). Mr. Justice Beetz merely reaffirms that position here. The burden is best
explained as a phenomenon associated with the presumption of constitutionality.
20 There are, however, several significant and particularly bitter exceptions. The
jurisdictional disputes over resource control and communications are important stage
one phenomena, but one would have thought that the Supreme Court could have dealt
with some or all of these disputes in stage two (concurrent powers) terms. See CIGOL,
supra note 5; Central Canada Potash, supra note 5; A.G. Que. v. Kellogg's Co. of Can.,
[1978] 2 S.C.R. 211, 83 D.L.R. (3d) 314; Capital Cities Communications Inc. v.
C.R.T.C., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 141, 81 D.L.R. (3d) 609, 36 C.P.R. (2d) 1; and Dionne v.
Public Service Bd., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 191, 83 D.L.R. (3d) 178.
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Where factual evidence can firmly establish the effect of the challenged law,
that evidence is crucial to determination of constitutionality. All efforts
should be made to set it before the court. If the law is operating, evidence
of its actual performance would be a compelling consideration. Where the
constitutional question takes form as a reference on proposed legislation,
evidence as to the reasonable expectations of experts would be relevant.
Third, the legislation should stand or fall only as a matter of fact in the
circumstances. 21 Broad constitutional rulings which carve out large and
exclusive legislative fields independently of the actual facts at issue en-
courage federal tensions. Fourth, courts should apply unsparingly the
presumption of constitutionality in federalist disputes. The presumption
should be applied as an evidentiary presumption and not only as a pre-
sumption of regularity or a canon of construction. The judges ought to make
clear to counsel attacking federal or provincial statutes that counsel must,
where relevant, build an evidentiary record capable of overcoming any
significant or disputed isue of fact. If counsel fails to present necessary
facts, the presumption of constitutionality will defeat him on the constitu-
tional issue.
C. Constitutional Policy and Legislative Policy Distinguished
This view of constitutional law, and the lively interest in the presump-
tion of constitutionality that it implies, gathers strength from a philosophy
of federalism in which considerations relevant to the formulation of policy
are important. By this view, the court does have a very significant role to
play in the formulation of constitutional policy. It is crucial, however, to
realize that constitutional policy is not the same as legislative policy.
Constitutional policy (as relevant to federalist disputes) involves power
allocation; legislative policy involves the uses of power once allocated. 22
Three questions are central to the making of constitutional policy. The court
2 1 This already is happening. A government frustrated by a ruling of constitutional
incompetence on a particular law often tries again. Recent examples include the Govern-
ment of Saskatchewan, which, frustrated in its efforts to tax oil profits by The Oil and
Gas Conservation, Stabilization and Development Act, 1973, S.S. 1973-74, c. 72, as
amended by S.S. 1973-74, c. 73, introduced retroactive legislation to accomplish the
same purpose by a different taxing scheme: see The Oil Well Income Tax Act, 1978,
S.S. 1977-78, c. 26. New Brunswick, finding its scheme to tax promotional materials
(Social Services and Education Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. S-10, s. 4) frustrated by the
Supreme Court of Canada in Simpsons-Sears Ltd. v. Prov. Sec'y of N.B., [1978] 2 S.C.R.
869, 82 D.L.R. (3d) 321, has recently sought to accomplish the same purpose by
amended legislation.
22 The distinction was grasped early in Canadian constitutional law. For example,
in Union Colliery Co. of B.C. v. Bryden, [1899] A.C. 580 at 585 (P.C.), Lord Watson
said:
It is the proper function of a court of law to determine what are the limits of
the jurisdiction committed to them [Parliament and the Legislatures]; but, when
that point has been settled, courts of law have no right whatever to inquire
whether their jurisdiction has been exercised wisely or not.
However, the implications of the distinction have never fully been appreciated. In
particular, it has never before been fully discerned that there are policy issues relevant
to the judicial function of determining the limits of jurisdiction, and that such issues
might overlap with what Lord Watson calls inquiry into the wisdom of legislation.
[VOL. 18, NO. 1
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must inquire: (1) Whether the interest advanced by the enacting legislature
has a reasonable connection to that legislature's catalogue of powers, (2)
whether the ch.allenged law unduly interferes with the interests of the other
level of government, and (3) whether, on consideration of the interests and
interference involved, the challenged legislation ought to stand or fall.
Constitutional policy-making may often overlap with the process by
which legislative policy is formulated. The existence of an alternative legis-
lative scheme, equally effective but less obnoxious to interests of the other
level of government, certainly would be relevant to the process of constitu-
tional scrutiny explained above. But overlap does not imply congruence.
The identification of sound constitutional policy does not necessarily follow
the same method of inquiry nor use the same legal and social materials as
does the discovery of sound legislative policy. That is why the court must be
astute to respect the legislature's determination of legislative policy. This
essential point was made early in United States constitutional history in
Ogden v. Saunders, where Mr. Justice Washington said:
It is but a decent respect due to the wisdom ... of the legislative body, by which
any law is passed, to presume in favor of its validity, until its violation of the
constitution is proved beyond all reasonable doubt.23
The distinction between constitutional policy and legislative policy in
part explains why courts engaged in the process of constitutional decision
ought to have policy materials brought before them. They should have such
materials pleaded and proved in evidence as are relevant to their task.
Although this evidence will not be the same as that brought before the
legislature, by reason of the different tasks involved, there will be overlap.24
23 Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 212 at 270 (1827). The point is more
fully elaborated by Professor Thayer in his masterful article, The Origin and Scope of
the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law (1893-94), 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129 at 152 as
follows:
The judges were allowed, indirectly and in a degree, the power to revise the action
of other departments and to pronounce it null. In simple truth, while this is a
mere judicial function, it involves, owing to the subject-matter with which it deals,
taking a part, a secondary part, in the political conduct of government. If that be
so, then the judges must apply methods and principles that befit their task. In such
a work there can be no permanent or fitting modus vivendi between the different
departments unless each is sure of the full co-operation of the others, so long as
its own action conforms to any reasonable and fairly permissible view of its con-
stitutional power. The ultimate arbiter of what is rational and permissible is indeed
always the courts, so far as litigated cases bring the question before them. This
leaves to our courts a great and stately jurisdiction. It will only imperil the whole
of it if it is sought to give them more. They must not step into the shoes of the
law-maker....
24 The overlap is expected to be much greater when the constitutional issue involves
fundamental freedoms protected under a Bill of Rights. Unlike federalist disputes, Bill
of Rights issues are concerned with limitations on governmental power. The sole ques-
tion is whether the law itself advances a sufficiently critical governmental interest. Thus,
the wisdom of legislative policy is more directly called into question. Herein lies the
explanation why American courts deal in policy questions and materials which, to a
Canadian legal mind, oftentimes seem unthinkable. If our Bill of Rights is entrenched,
or as it matures in its present form, the inevitable drift of our constitutional jurispru-
dence must be in this direction.
19801
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To assist in bringing policy materials before the court, the presumption of
constitutionality ought to be rigorously applied in favour of the legislature's
determination of policy. This does not mean that the litigant challenging
the validity of any law in the federalist dispute context has to show that such
law is unwise. What the presumption requires him to show is that, as a
matter of constitutional policy, the law is unwise (or invalid) beyond all
rational doubt in that the interference produced is intolerable considering
the interest advanced.
Numerous Canadian judges have stated that in constitutional litigation
courts have no legitimate authority to interfere with legislative determination
of policy.25 Many explanations of this self-imposed restraint have been
given.nO Those who advocate judicial restraint in policy matters have never
considered the implications of a distinction between constitutional policy
and legislative policy.27 The plea for judicial restraint has assumed that the
25 The most recent statement to this effect is by Morrow .A. in Reference re
Proposed Legislation Concerning Leased Premises and Tenancy Agreements (1979), 89
D.L.R. (3d) 460 (Alta. S.C. App. Div.) at 469: "We certainly, as a court, cannot get
into the area of policy. ... "
26 See the debate on this point between Professor Laskin (as he then was) and Mr.
Mundell: Mundell, Tests for Validity of Legislation Under the British North America
Act (1954), 32 Can. B. Rev. 813; Laskin, Tests for the Validity of Legislation: What's
the "Matter"? (1955), 11 U. Toronto LJ. 114; and Mundell, Tests for Validity of
Legislation Under The British North America Act: A Reply to Professor Laskin (1955),
33 Can. B. Rev. 915.
27 With great respect, a good example of confusion between constitutional and legis-
lative policy-making is given in McWhinney, Federal Supreme Courts and Constitutional
Review (1967), 45 Can. B. Rev. 578 at 586. Professor McWhinney writes:
As to the Privy Council and its record of interpretation of the Canadian Constitu-
tion, my criticism had been directed specifically to the failure of the Privy Council
frankly to acknowledge and admit, in its formal opinions accompanying its deci-
cisions, that it was engaging in constitutional elaborations that were neither ex-
pressly warranted by the text of the constitution, nor supported by the original
historical intentions of the Founding Fathers of the constitution, in reaching the
results that the Privy Council did, in the period from 1896 onwards, in relation
to social and economic planning legislation and Dominion-provincial relations
generally. The judicial policy-maker surely has certain obligations of public can-
dour, in order to expose the judicial policy choices to the democratic corrective of
public discussion and criticism. The failure of the Privy Council, in relation to the
Canadian Constitution, to be frank and explicit as to the policy bases of its opin-
ions, meant that the reasons for the actual policy choices too often remained
obscured and concealed, with the policy considerations necessarily operating then
as "inarticulate major premises" to the final decision. And the failure to articulate
these same policy bases meant, in turn, that the judges were not directly assisted
by counsel, through the Brandeis Brief technique of bringing social and economic
facts before the court, or otherwise, in the building of an appropriate factual
record that might inform and assist a judicial conclusion on complex social and
economic issues. If we had judicial policy-making on the part of the Privy Council
in relation to the Canadian Constitution, in the period from 1896 onwards, it was,
necessarily, because of these very omissions, a species of policy-making in the
dark,--at best, loosely impressionistic and in the end rather hit-and-miss.
There is, I think, an important difference between "social and economic planning legis-
lation" and "Dominion-provincial relations generally" that this passage does not grasp.
"Social and economic planning legislation" is for the legislature as a matter of legislative
(VOL. 18, NO. I
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presumption of constitutionality aids its cause. The result of this thinking
has been unfortunate.
In A.G. Ont. v. A.G. Can., Earl Loreburn L.C. suggested one reason
why policy matters were for the legislature and not for the court; it must be
presumed, he said, that the legislature considered all relevant policies:
Such considerations are proper, no doubt, to be weighed by those who make and
by those who administer the laws of Canada, nor is any Court of law entitled to
suppose that they have not been or will not be duly so weighed. So far as it is a
matter of wisdom or policy, it is for the determination of the Parliament.... It
cannot be too strongly put that with the wisdom or expediency or policy of an
Act, lawfully passed, no Court has a word to say. All, therefore, that their Lord-
ships can consider ... is whether ... this Act is outside the authority of the
Canadian Parliament, which is purely a question of the constitutional law of
Canada.2 8
The presumption of constitutionality is applied by the Lord Chancellor as
a presumption of regularity. So used, the presumption excludes the court
from developing policy perspectives on the immediate question. The court
presumes that the legislature already has done so; further scrutiny is not a
proper judicial task.
However, the distinction between constitutional and legislative policy
is not drawn. Both are excluded from judicial consideration by the blunt
approach taken. Failure to make the relevant distinction enables the pre-
sumption of constitutionality to be pressed into service to advance a
philosophy of judicial timidity in policy matters.
A.G. Ont. v. A.G. Can. suggests a second point worthy of notice. The
question of constitutional validity is treated as a question of pure law.
Factual materials thereby become irrelevant. Restricted to a presumption of
regularity, the presumption of constitutionality offers no resistance to this
formulation of the problem. The result is that both factual and policy
materials are excluded from the court's consideration. This implies that an
abstract legal answer necessarily will be forthcoming from the court. Such
abstract answers have a tendency to be broad.
This treatment of the presumption of constitutionality and the con-
stitutional jurisprudence that it engenders has been extremely damaging to
our constitutional law. Today, it is of exceptional importance that the
different senses in which the presumption of constitutionality doctrine is
used be distinguished, and that more sophisticated use be made of the tool.
Canadian constitutional law is developing and must develop in the 1980's
and 1990's a heightened sensitivity to issues of constitutional policy and
appreciation of constitutional facts. A sound theory of the presumption of
policy; "Dominion-provincial relations generally" are for the courts when political and
administrative channels break down-.e., when asked. The distinction takes on added
relevance in the Canadian context where social and economic planning legislation was
tested in the context of a constitution without a Bill of Rights and which pays respect
to the theory of Parliamentary Sovereignty. Thus, the issue in Canada during the thirties,
unlike the United States, was a pure federalist dispute-a question of power allocation.
28 [1912] A.C. 571 at 583, 3 D.L.R. 509 at 512-13 (P.C.).
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constitutionality is of central importance to a renewed and modem con-
stitutional jurisprudence. To that theory we must now turn.
What follows is an examination of the presumption of constitutionality
under three different categories. Each category suggests a very different
sense, and implies a distinct class of cases to which the presumption is
relevant. The separate branches of the presumption of constitutionality are:
(1) a presumption of regularity, (2) a canon of construction, and (3) a
true evidentiary presumption of fact.
II. CATEGORIES OF THE PRESUMPTION
A. Presumption of Regularity
. "[O]mnia praesumuntur solemniter esse acta"-all things are presumed
to have been done rightly. 29 Apply this homely maxim to the determination
of constitutional validity and its prim and proper certitudes waver. Does the
presumption of regularity refer to procedural regularity? Does it refer to
substantive jurisdictional regularity, or does it mean that all factual pre-
conditions are presumed to have been satisfied? To take an example: section
54 of The British North America Act, 1867, provides that:
It shall not be lawful for the House of Commons to adopt or pass any Vote,
Resolution, Address, or Bill for the Appropriation of any Part of the Public
Revenue, or of any Tax or Impost, to any Purpose that has not been first recom-
mended to that House by Message of the Governor General in the Session in
which such Vote, Resolution, Address, or Bill is proposed. 80
Suppose a particular taxing measure is attacked for want of compliance
with section 54. What is the effect of omnia praesumuntur solemniter esse
acta? Does it translate into a presumption that the section 54 procedure
was followed? Is it a presumption that the House of Commons rules81 for
introducing taxing bills as a matter of law substantively comply with section
54, or does the presumption assist with an answer to the now open question
of whether failure to comply with section 54 cannot be judicially reviewed
as being a point of parliamentary procedure cognizable by the House of
Commons alone?82
Such ambiguity does not invite precise application. The Supreme Court,
when this very issue was presented for consideration, avoided not only the
constitutional question, but ducked the presumption as well.8
29 Co. Litt. 6.b. Actually Lord Coke gives several versions of the maxim: "Omnia
praesumuntur legitime facta, donec probetur in contrarium," op. cit. at 232.b.; and
"Omnia praesumuntur rite et solemnitas esse acta donee probetur in contrarium," op. cit.
at 232. See also Brown's Maxims, at 944: "Omnia rite acta praesumuntur." In Beacom
v. Robison, 157 Pa. Super. 515 at 521, 43 Atl. (2d) 640 at 643 (1945), the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court stated: "Mhe doctrine of omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta, [is a]
maxim [which] appears in various forms, but all are approximated in the language that a
prima facie presumption of the regularity of the acts of public officers exists until the
contrary appears."
30 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.).
31 Can. H. of C. Standing Orders, s. 62(1), 1969.
32 The last point is discussed by Laskin CJ.C. in Reference re Agricultural Products
Marketing Act, supra note 4, at 395-96 (N.R.), 278-79 (D.L.R.).
33 d.
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It is necessary to distinguish two separate senses in which the pre-
sumption of regularity operates. It may shed light on (1) the issue of
legislative intent or (2) the issue of legislative declarations of facts.
1. Legislative Intent
Traditionally, Canadian courts, in answering questions as to con-
stitutional validity, examine the object and purpose of a challenged statute.
In one sense (but only one) object and purpose go to legislative intent: the
enacting legislature must have intended to pursue a regulatory motive
within its substantive jurisdictional capacity.34 The object and purpose test
looks to the result that the enacting legislature hoped to achieve. As ex-
plained by Lord Maugham in the Bank Taxation Reference:
A closely similar matter may call for consideration, namely, the object or purpose
of the Act in question .... It is not competent either for the Dominion or a
Province under the guise, or the pretence, or in the form of an exercise of its own
powers, to carry out an object which is beyond its powers .... 35
Conceived as a matter of legislative intent, it is clear that the object and
purpose test is subjective. That conclusion is reinforced by Lord Maugham's
statement. It is the subjective intent of an incorporeal entity. 6 It may be that
the object and purpose test simpliciter is an insufficient foundation upon
which to ground constitutional decision,37 but that does not mean that it
34 Mr. Justice Duff in A.G. Ont. v. Reciprocal Insurers, [1924] A.C. 328 at 338,
[1924] 1 D.L.R. 789 at 795, 41 C.C.C. 336 at 343-44 (P.C.), explained Union Colliery,
supra note 22, as a case where an improper legislative motive invalidated the challenged
law. A second sense in which object and purpose are used is explained by Mundell,
Tests for Validity of Legislation Under the British North America Act, supra note 26,
at 832.
3 A.G. Alta. v. A.G. Can., [1939] A.C. 117 at 130, [1938] 4 D.L.R. 433 at 439
(P.C.) [hereinafter Bank Taxation Reference]. Mundell, in Tests for Validity of Legisla-
tion Under the British North America Act, id. at 828, explained the point this way:
Control and regulation ... are undertaken with some object or aim in view, to
achieve some results in connection with the things, activities or concepts described
in the "matter." It is this object or aim that constitutes Parliament's purpose.
In Tests for the Validity of Legislation: What's the "Matter"?, supra note 26, Professor
Laskin (as he then was) expressed the opinion, at 115, that Mr. Mundell displayed a
"ndivete" about constitutional law.
36Bank Taxation Reference, id. at 131 (A.C.), 439 (D.L.R.): "It must be remem-
bered that the object or purpose of the Act, in so far as it does not plainly appear from
its terms and its probable effect, is that of an incorporeal entity, namely, the Legisla-
ture...." Mr. Mundell made the same point: Tests for Validity of Legislation Under
the British North America Act, id. at 832:
We must then look also to the state of mind of Parliament when enacting the
law, to ascertain the motive that impelled Parliament to provide for the control
or regulation brought about by the legislation and with what matter it is con-
nected. This test is subjective.
3 7 Strayer, Judicial Review of Legislation in Canada (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto
Press, 1968) at 16 downplays the significance of legislative intent considerably. His
point is that:
mhe essential question is not intention of the legislature but effect of the statute.
In the majority of cases the two may be identical. But in the crucial cases the
court must see what the statute really does, not what its framers intended it to
do....
19801
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
is not a relevant consideration. In Co-operative Committee on Japanese
Canadians v. A.G. Can., Lord Wright made it clear that an illegal purpose,
as a matter of subjective legislative intent, would upset a challenged statute:
Their Lordships do not doubt the proposition that an exercise of the power for an
unauthorized purpose would be invalid, and the only question is whether there is
apparent any matter which justifies the judiciary in coming to the conclusion that
the power was in fact exercised for an unauthorized purpose. In their Lordships'
opinion there is not. The first three sub-sections of s. 2 no doubt deal with the
matter which primarily engaged the attention of the Governor in Council, but it
is not in their Lordships' view a proper inference from the terms of those sub-
sections that the Governor in Council did not also deem it necessary or advisable
for the security, defence, peace, order and welfare of Canada that the wives and
children under sixteen of deportees should against their will also be liable to
deportation. 8
A presumption of regularity as applied to the issue of subjective legis-
lative intent can mean only that the court assumes that the legislature acted
with the requisite object and purpose and not with any illegal end in
view. That point was made in a public law context by Lord Pearson in
McEldowney v. Forde:
When the Minister has made a regulation, and purports to have it made under s.
1(3) of the Act, the presumption of regularity (omnia praesumuntur rite esse
acta) applies and the regulation is assumed prima facie to be intra vires. But if
the validity of the regulation ... was made otherwise than for the specified pur-
poses, the courts will have to decide this issue, however difficult the task may be
for them in some circumstances.0 9
The point is old and well established in the Canadian constitutional context.
A nineteenth century British Columbia court put it this way:
mhe Provincial Legislature in purporting to give appellate jurisdiction must be
presumed to have contemplated such matters only as were within its own power,
and not such matters as were expressly removed from its regulation.40
That holding was sharpened and reinforced by Mr. Justice Fauteux in
Reference Re Farm Products Marketing Act (Ont.) who said: "There is a
presumptio juris as to the existence of the bona fide intention of a legislative
body to confine itself to its own sphere...." 41
How may the presumption of regular legislative intent-the intention
to effect a legal object and purpose-be overcome? In administrative law
cases, the courts have had no hesitation in reviewing factual evidence,
including statements or letters by the authorities concerned, to determine
the regularity of the authority's legislative or administrative intent. In
Roncarelli v. Duplessis,4 Martland J. noted that cancellation of a liquor
licence in pursuit of purposes unrelated to those of the relevant Alcoholic
Liquor Act voided the administrative action. The intent of the cancelling
88 [1947] A.C. 87 at 107-08, [1947] 1 D.L.R. 577 at 591-92 (P.C.).
s9 [1971] A.C. 632 at 655, [1969] 3 W.L.R. 179 at 197, [1969] 2 All E.R. 1039
at 1066 (H.L.).
40 Scott v. Scott (1891), 4 B.C.R. 316 at 319; see also Reference re Section 31 of
the Municipal District Act Amendment Act, 1941, [1943] S.C.R. 295, [1943] 3 D.L.R. 145.
41 [1957] SC.R. 198 at 255, 7 D.L.R. (2d) 257 at 311.
42 [1959] S.C.R. 121 at 156, 16 D.L.R. (2d) 689 at 742.
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authority was proved by evidence. In Re Doctors Hospital and Minister of
Health,43 an Order-in-Council revoking approval of Doctors Hospital as a
statutory "public hospital" was attacked. The Court held that since the
order had been made with the intent of saving public moneys, a purpose not
contemplated by the parent statute, the order could not stand. In Re Hepp-
ner and Minister of Environment,44 the Alberta Court of Appeal applied
a presumption of regularity to subordinate legislation establishing restricted
development areas to control development detrimental to the environment.
On affirmative proof, including letters of the relevant minister and his
assistant deputy, that the minister's intent was to establish a transportation
and utility corridor, the legislation was struck down. The point to notice is
that in each of these cases, the presumption of a regular legislative or
administrative intent was overcome by actual evidence to the contrary on
the specific point of intention. In an administrative law setting, "The admis-
sibility of ... [factual] evidence [on the issue of legislative intent] ... seems
so clear as not to require authority. ... 45
The transposition of the administrative law principle to a constitutional
context is problematic. In the administrative law cases, the issue of intent
concerns the intent of a specific person. In the constitutional cases, the issue
of intent concerns the legislature, an incorporeal body made up of hundreds
of persons. It may be said that such a body, like a corporation, is a legal
fiction and has no intention in the relevant sense. It would follow that
legislative intent, in the constitutional setting, is a hollow concept.
Largely in consideration of this argument, Canadian courts have
developed the rule that, in scrutinizing legislative intent for the purpose of
determining constitutional validity, statements by members of the legislature
during passage of the challenged Act are irrelevant and inadmissible. 46
43 (1976), 12 O.R. (2d) 164, 68 D.L.R. (3d) 220 (H.C.).
44 (1978), 80 D.L.R. (3d) 112, 6 A.R. 154 (Alta. S.C. App. Div.).
4 5 LaRush v. Metropolitan Toronto and Region Conservation Auth., [1968] 1 O.R.
300 at 307, 66 D.L.R. (2d) 310 at 316-17 (C.A.).
46 Toronto Ry. Co. v. The Queen (1894), 4 Ex. C.R. 262 at 270; Gosselin v. The
King (1903), 33 S.C.R. 255. In Texada Mines Ltd. v. A.G.R.C., [1960] S.C.R. 713 at
720, 24 D.L.R. (2d) 81 at 87, the Court said this in obiter:
While that learned judge ... referred to certain statements purporting to have
been made by the Premier of the Province and the Minister of Mines to the effect
that the legislation was designed to discourage the export of iron ore ... he made
it clear that he came to his conclusion without reference to this. That such a state-
ment had been made was not proven at the trial and had the evidence been
tendered it would, no doubt, have been rejected as inadmissible.
The point was fortified by the Court in A.G. Can. v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, [1961] S.C.R.
775 at 792, 30 D.L.R. (2d) 296 at 311:
It ... is clear on the authorities that the statement of the Minister in introducing
the bill would be inadmissible in aid of the interpretation of the statute.. . . I can
discern no difference in principle to afford a sufficient reason for holding it to be
admissible where, the words of the statute being plain, it is sought to show that
Parliament was encroaching upon a field committed exclusively to the provincial
legislature.
Saumur v. A.G. Que., [1963] B.R. 116 at 123, aff'd on other grounds, [1964] S.C.R. 252;
B.C. Power Corp. v. A.G.B.C. (1963), 47 D.L.R. (2d) 633 at 733-34, 44 W.W.R. 65
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Several explanations of the rule have been put forward. Strayer has argued
that the rule is sound because legislative motive is irrelevant to constitutional
validity: "The essential factual issue here is that of effect.... ."7 More
convincingly, it has been argued that, considering the way in which the
Canadian process of enactment differs from that of the United States,
"Hansard gives no convincing proof of what the government intended
... ,,48 Moreover, by allowing ambiguities in the statute to be resolved by
statements in the legislature, ministers would be given power in effect to
legislate indirectly by making such statements. "Cabinets already have
powers enough without having this added unto them. '49
If this rule and associated explanations are sound, several wrinkles
develop in the presumption of regularity as applied to the issue of legislative
intent. If the presumption applies and the relevant factual evidence as to
intent cannot be brought forward in rebuttal, we reach an impasse. The
difficulty is not mitigated by the point that factual evidence may be brought
forward to show the effect of the statute. That evidence demonstrates object
and purpose in the objective sense. It casts no light on object and purpose in
the subjective sense. One is driven, therefore, to one of four conclusions.
Either (1) the presumption of regularity, as applied to the issue of subjective
legislative intent, is irrebuttable; (2) the presumption does not apply to the
issue of legislative intent; (3) the issue of legislative intent is irrelevant to the
process of constitutional decision; or (4) the rule against admissibility of
members' statements is wrong.
Alternative (1) may be rejected out of hand. The many statements
by Canadian judges that legislatures may not effect colourable purposes
under the guise of acting within their own powers,50 or by doing indirectly
that which they cannot do directly, 51 make such a suggestion untenable. For
the same reason, alternative (3) must be rejected. There are too many
at 172 (B.C.S.C.). See generally MacDonald, Constitutional Interpretation and Extrinsic
Evidence (1939), 17 Can. B. Rev. 77. However, in Bank Taxation Reference, supra
note 35, at 131 (A.C.), 439 (D.L.R.), Lord Maugham said: "[Tihe object and purpose
of the Act, ... is that of an incorporeal entity, namely, the Legislature, and, generally
speaking, the speeches of individuals would have little evidential weight." This suggests
not a rule going to inadmissibility, but a caution as to weight. Similarly, the Court in
A.G. Can. v. Reader's Digest Ass'n., op. cit. at 792 (S.C.R.), 311 (D.L.R.), says that
ministerial statements would be inadmissible when "the words of the statute [are]
plain.... " Presumably, if the words of the statute are not plain, the rule would be
otherwise.
4 7 Supra note 37, at 166.
48 Corry, The Use of Legislative History in the Interpretation of Statutes (1954),
32 Can. B. Rev. 624 at 633. See also an article by Driedger, The Preparation of Legisla-
tion (1953), 31 Can. B. Rev. 33, for discussion of the Canadian and American legis-
lative process.
49 Corry, id. at 637.
50 E.g., Re Wolfenden (1971), 21 D.L.R. (3d) 118 at 125-26, [1971] 5 W.W.R. 168 at
177 (B.C.S.C.), atJ'd sub nom. Min. of Finance for B.C. v. First National Bank of Nevada,
[1975] 1 S.C.R. 525, 40 D.L.R. (3d) 739, aff'g (1972), 28 D.L.R. (3d) 756 (B.C.C.A.).5 1 Amax Potash Ltd. v. Gov't of Sask., [1977] 2 S.C.R. 576 at 590, 71 D.L.R. (3d)
1 at 10.
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cases that have grounded constitutional decision on legislative intent to
pretend that the doctrine does not exist.52
If the presumption does not apply to the issue of legislative intent
(alternative (2)), then legislative intent must really be irrelevant. There
would be no presumption to indicate whether the intent was or was not
regular and by the rule previously stated no evidence could be led to dis-
cover the actual intent. Thus, the intent could be neither known nor
presumed; clearly, in that case, it could not influence the constitutional
decision. However, for the reasons given for rejecting alternatives (1) and
(3)-that such a conclusion cuts too sharply across the decided cases 3
-this result appears unwarranted.
This leaves alternative (4), which postulates that the rule against
admissibility of statements by members of the legislature as an aid in
determining constitutionality is wrong. Alternative (4) also cuts against the
decided cases, but it does so assisted by very sharp criticism of such
Canadian cases as exist,54 and by the example of a flourishing but contrary
rule in the United States.55 Is alternative (4) tenable?
52 Bank Taxation Reference, supra note 35; A.G. Ont. v. Reciprocal Insurers, supra
note 34; In re Insurance Act of Canada, [1932] A.C. 41, [1932] 1 D.L.R. 97, [1931] 3
W.W.R. 689, 53 Que. K.B. 34 (P.C.); A.G. Sask. v. A.G. Can., [1949] A.C. 110, [1949]
2 D.L.R. 145. Although Professor Hogg in Constitutional Law of Canada, (Toronto:
Carswell, 1977) at 87 attempts to explain away the issue of subjective legislative intent
by saying that "[The colourability doctrine] ... simply means that 'form is not con-
trolling in the determination of essential character'." That seems a partial explanation
only; what the courts have said suggests something beyond mere form.
63 Supra notes 50-51. See also Reference re Farm Products Marketing Act (Ont.),
supra note 41, per Fauteux J. For a collection of English cases stating the rule, see
Annotation, Resort to Constitutional or Legislative Debates, Committee Reports, Jour-
nals, Etc., as Aid in Construction of Constitution or Statute (1931), 70 A.L.R. 5 at 14.
54 Davis, Legislative History and the Wheat Board Case (1953), 31 Can. B. Rev. 1
(courts should look at statements by members of the legislature in construing Acts of
Parliament: an administrative law context); Milner, The Use of Legislative History
(1953), 31 Can. B. Rev. 228; Kilgour, The Rule Against the Use of Legislative History:
"Canon of Construction or Counsel of Caution"? (1952), 30 Can. B. Rev. 769. See
contra: MacQuarrie, The Use of Legislative History (1952), 30 Can. B. Rev. 958; Corry,
supra note 48; and Strayer, supra note 37, at 165-66. The author ought to add a per-
sonal view, which developed while law-clerking at the Supreme Court of Canada close
to the process of judicial decisions, that judicially created per se doctrines such as this
are really toothless tigers. They survive only so long as useful. If it becomes useful to
scrap the rule in a particular decision, it will go, and nicely too. The rule against ad-
missibility of extrinsic aids in constitutional construction (very similar to the rule against
admissibility of members' statements) was exhaustively reviewed by J. tenBroek, Ad-
missibility and Use by the United States Supreme Court of Extrinsic Aids in Constitu-
tional Construction (1938), 27 Cal. L. Rev. 287 at 308, who concluded:
Like all the other instruments of the Court its ultimate utility depends on its
merits as an instrument of persuasion in that most indispensable of judicial func-
tions, namely, writing the most convincing opinion possible under the circum-
stances. We must conclude, the test of the invocability of the rule being a matter
of forensic expediency, that collateral materials may be introduced in all cases in
which they tend to assist the Court in supporting the decision reached.
55 See Annotation; Resort to Constitutional or Legislative Debates, Etc., supra note
53, at 6.
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Assume that constitutional attack is made against a particular con-
ditional grant from the federal government to the provinces. The grant is to
support post-secondary education. Conditions attached to the grant require
that qualifying provinces maintain freedom of language choice for certain
residents (as defined in the granting act) in primary education. The Prov-
ince of Quebec complains that the conditions force it to reverse its language
and education policies and to repeal certain recent legislation. Its submis-
sion in the litigation is against the conditions only on the theory that
the federal government, by ostensibly legislating in relation to the public
debt and property,58 is colourably attempting to formulate policy in relation
to education and language.
Suppose further that Hansard reveals that, during debate on the ap-
propriation bill, the Prime Minister made the point that the bill was Ottawa's
response to Quebec's language policies and legislation. "It is our hope," he
said, "that the provinces will respond to our legislation by amending their
language laws." The opposition leaders record their approval. Ought such
evidence crucial to the constitutional issue be ruled inadmissible?
If there is ambiguity in the statute or as its constitutional validity and
evidence relevant to resolving that ambiguity having probative value is
brought forward, the evidence ought to be admitted. Evidence of members'
statements on the example contemplated is relevant and has probative value.
The only useful question would be as to weight. The weight given to the
evidence should vary with its nature and the circumstances. It is unsubtle
to rule per se that such evidence is inadmissible.57
The above example seeks to support the admissibility of evidence sug-
gesting that the bill was passed in pursuit of regulatory purposes beyond the
enacting government's powers. This position gathers strength from remarks
made by Mr. Justice Beetz in Reference re Anti-Inflation Act; in that
landmark of modem constitutional law, Mr. Justice Beetz referred to
speeches by various Ministers in Parliament as reproduced in Hansard:
"in order not to construe and apply the provisions of the Anti-Inflation Act,
but to ascertain its constitutional pivot. ' 8
The purpose of this exercise was to support the conclusion that no
emergency existed sufficient to trigger Parliament's extraordinary power.
As Mr. Justice Beetz explained:
56 The British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3,s.91 (IA), as am. by 1949,
13 Geo. 6, c. 81 (U.K.). See generally, Magnet, The Constitutional Distribution of
Taxation Powers in Canada (1978), 10 Ottawa L. Rev. 473 at 480-84 for amplification
of the constitutional questions posed by this example.
57 See, for additional arguments, Constitutional Law-Admissibility of Evidence as
to Effect of Impugned Statute as Aid in Determining Validity (1940), 18 Can. B. Rev.
657 at 658-59. Moreover, there is Canadian authority which supports this conclusion: In
Bank Taxation Reference, supra note 35, (A.C.), 439 (D.L.R.), Lord Maugham said,
"[G]enerally speaking, the speeches of individuals would have little evidential weight [in
determination of object and purpose]." At face value admissibility is assumed with a
caution as to weight.
58 Reference re Anti-Inflation Act, supra note 5, at 470 (S.C.R.), 534 (D.L.R.).
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Reliance upon those statements is not essential to my conclusions. However, they
reinforce my opinion that the Anti-Inflation Act was enacted in this form because
it was believed, erroneously, that Parliament had the ordinary power to enact it
under the national concern or national dimension doctrine, that is, a basis which
coincides identically with the first submission made to us by counsel for Canada.
Parliament did not purport to enact it under the extraordinary power which it
possesses in time of national crisis.59
It is clear that Mr. Justice Beetz contemplated a distinction between admis-
sion of members' statements as an aid in construction and admission for
the ascertainment of the Act's "constitutional pivot." Admitting, arguendo,
the distinction to be valid, subjective legislative intent and its ascertainment
by members' speeches become relevant in constitutional law. The statements
reinforce the conclusion that the members thought that no emergency
existed, and that adds weight, in Mr. Justice Beetz's view, to the conclusion
of constitutional incompetence.
One might suppose that the Minister's statements are no more than
another piece of objective evidence going to test the existence of an
emergency-that is what those in a position to know thought about the
existence of the supposed emergency. However, Mr. Justice Beetz does not
use the statements in that way. Rather, he uses them to demonstrate the
subjective intent of the legislature, the kind of purpose pursued and the
source of constitutional power claimed relevant to that purpose. It may be
that something of the rule as to inadmissibility of members' statements as
an aid in construction survives, but the Reference re Anti-Inflation Act
sweeps aside the rule for tests of constitutional validity.
Further, the distinction between members' statements as an aid in
construction and as an aid in determining the "constitutional pivot" is too
specious. The difference is imperceptible-it certainly does not warrant a
per se exclusion rule in the former case and open admissibility in the latter.60
Any objections to the admissibility of members' statements could be met by
a requirement that there be true ambiguity and by a caution going to weight
of the evidence. On balance, therefore, evidence of members' statements,
where relevant, ought to be admitted.
If this conclusion is sound, then the presumption of regularity takes on
an added relevance where ambiguous legislative intent is crucial to the
process of constitutional decision. The court should not hesitate to apply the
presumption in order to require the building of an adequate evidentiary record
helpful to resolving the disputed question. In this way, constitutional scrutiny
of challenged legislation may be refined and more precise judicial answers may
be given.
2. Legislative Declarations of Facts
Certain legislative powers require the existence of factual conditions
before they can be constitutionally exercised. The most obvious example is
59 Id. at 472 (S.C.R.), 535 (D.L.R.).
60 See text accompanying notes 42-45, supra.
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Parliament's extraordinary power to invade provincial heads of jurisdiction
during times of national crisis. A condition precedent to Parliament's lawful
resort to the power is the existence, in fact, of an emergency. A second
example would be provincial regulation of marketing congestion in certain
commodities. Constitutionally competent regulation requires that the market,
in fact, be provincial in scope; it could not be interprovincial or international.
As a last example, regulation of local transport or communications under-
takings by a province, or of interprovincial undertakings by Parliament,
requires that organization of such undertakings, as a matter of fact, be sub-
stantially local or interprovincial, as the case may be. If the factual precon-
ditions are not satisfied, the legislation must fall for constitutional defect."'
Where factual preconditions to the constitutionally valid exercise of
legislative power exist, it would be unthinkable that the legislature would
refrain from investigating the sufficiency of the necessary facts. The legis-
lature has a formidable array of fact-finding machinery available for the
purpose. It can summon experts before committees, procure special in-depth
reports, or appoint royal commissions or other tribunals having wide in-
vestigatory powers under the Inquiries Acts. Judicial fact-finding tools pale
beside the impressive resources of the legislature.
The legislatures do, of course, gather facts. It has become increasingly
common for Canadian legislatures to declare in preambles to their acts the
factual circumstances impelling them to legislative action or the constitutional
facts supporting exercise of legislative power. In the Anti-Inflation Act, for
example, the preamble contains the following:
WHEREAS the Parliament of Canada recognizes that inflation in Canada at cur-
rent levels is contrary to the interests of all Canadians and that the containment
and reduction of inflation has become a matter of serious national concern;
AND WHEREAS to accomplish such containment and reduction of inflation it is
necessary to restrain profit margins, prices, dividends and compensation; ... .62
Legislative facts were declared in Montreal By-Law 3926 (considered by the
Supreme Court of Canada in A.G. Can. v. Dupond) as follows:
WHEREAS it is imperative to provide for the protection of citizens in the exer-
cise of their liberties, safeguard public peace and prevent violence against persons
and property;
WHEREAS violence, armed robberies and other criminal acts often accompany
certain demonstrations;
WHEREAS it is in order to enact exceptional emergency measures for the protec-
tion of citizens and the maintenance of peace and public order;
WHEREAS it is in order to regulate the use of the public domain and safeguard
the right of citizens to the peaceful enjoyment of the public domain of the City;
61 Examples are: Emergency: Fort Frances Pulp and Power Co. v. Man. Free Press
Co., [1923] A.C. 695, [1923] 3 D.L.R. 629 (P.C.); Reference re Wartime Leasehold
Regulations, [1950] S.C.R. 124, [1950] 2 D.L.R. 1; and Reference re Anti-Inflation Act,
supra note 5; Marketing: Man. Egg and Poultry Ass'n, supra note 6; and Reference re
Agricultural Products Marketing Act, supra note 4; Local and Interprovincial Under-
takings: C.P.R. v. A.G.B.C., [1950] A. C. 122, [1950] 1 D.L.R. 721 (P.C.); A.G. Ont.
v. Winner, [1954] A.C. 541, 13 W.W.R. 657, 71 C.R.T.C. 225 (P.C.); and Dionne,
supra note 20.
62 S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 75.
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and the ordinance passed by the Executive Committee of the City pursuant
to section 5 of the By-Law stated:
CONSIDERING there are reasonable grounds to believe that the holding of as-
semblies, parades or gatherings on the public domain of the City would endanger
the safety, peace or public order or might give rise to such danger;
CONSIDERING the exceptional situation prevailing in the City of Montreal and
the need to take preventative measures to safeguard peace and public order.
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Legislative declarations of facts such as these raise nice questions con-
cerning the presumption of regularity. How far towards irrebuttability does
the presumption go? Does the presumption suggest that the facts as found by
the legislature have not changed? Is there a presumption that the facts as
found are adequate to support the challenged exercise of power?
This set of questions, which is specifically relevant to the presumption
of regularity as applied to legislative declarations of facts, must be kept dis-
tinct from certain other situations. The difficulties do not concern whether or
how far the court can presume the existence of facts required to support a
challenged exercise of power. Conceptually, that is quite different. This last
would be relevant to the existence of facts that the court or counsel says exist;
the situation now considered relates to facts that the legislature says exist.
Two considerations make the instant problem especially probing:
(1) the high respect and comity that exist between the legislative and judicial
arms of government, and (2) the immensely superior fact-gathering capacity
of the legislature as compared to that of the court.
a) Rebuttable or Irrebuttable?
The presumption of regularity as applied to legislative declarations of
facts can mean only that the facts as declared, at least prima facie, are true.
The comity that must exist between the legislature and the judiciary is a
sufficient reason to apply the presumption in this way; the court presumes
that the legislature presents an adequate picture resulting from a sufficient
investigation. Any other attitude would tilt the court towards doubting in
various degrees the good faith or diligence of the legislature: sound govern-
ment cannot proceed on this basis.
Annexed to this is the relatively great capacity of the legislature to amass
legislative and constitutional facts. This must be contrasted with the relative
inexpertise of the courts in dealing with economic theories, specialist techni-
cal developments and the like. Courts are restricted to judicial notice of these
matters and the actual facts as elaborated in the case. These may be a poor
representation of reality. The issue, however, is not limited to two litigants,
but also concerns the limits of governmental power. Additionally, it should
be noted that legislative declarations of fact are often highly politically
charged, as the Montreal anti-demonstration by-law illustrates. Thus, ques-
tions are raised as to the proper role for court and legislature. Professor Hogg
has noted:
A legislature acts not merely on the basis of findings of fact, but upon its judg-
[1978] 2 S.C.R. 770 at 782-84, 84 D.L.R. (3d) 420 at 429-30.
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ment as to the public perceptions of a situation and its judgment as to the appro-
priate policy to meet the situation. These judgments are political.... It is not for
the court to disturb political judgments .... 64
In view of all of this, it is reasonable to think that the presumption takes
on added significance. Ultimately, it raises questions as to the conclusiveness
of a decision. As a Michigan court aptly put it at the turn of the century:
"Who shall decide the question, [of constitutional fact] and by what rule?
Shall it be the legislature or the courts?"65 In the Michigan case, the court was
clear to point out the "manifest absurdity"6 6 of allowing any tribunal power to
determine the constitutionality of a statute from the testimony developed in
the case. That view has found favour with some American and Australian
courts. Accordingly, there is a distinct line of authority that legislative de-
clarations of facts are conclusive. These cases accept that the presumption of
regularity, as applied to legislative declarations of facts, is irrebuttable.(7
This line of authority is forcefully contradicted in the majority of Ameri-
can cases and finds little support in Australia.68 The point is made that the
courts are the guardian of the constitution: that high responsibility cannot be
forfeited by adopting an overly deferential posture in the fact-finding process
64 Proof of Facts in Constitutional Cases (1976), 26 U. Toronto L.J. 386 at 396-97.
65 People v. Smith, 108 Mich. 527 at 533, 66 N.W. 382 at 383-84 (S. Ct. Mich.
1896). The same question was put by an Oregon Court in Kadderly v. City of Portland,
44 Or. 118 at 147, 74 P. 710 at 720 (S. Ct. Ore. 1903): "But the vital question is, what
tribunal is to determine whether a law does or does not fall under this classification?
Are the judgment and findings of the legislative assembly conclusive, or are they subject
to review by the courts"?
66 People v. Smith, id.
I7 The American authorities are set out in four annotations: see 7 A.L.R. 519 at
522; 55 A.L.R. 779; 90 A.L.R. 328; 110 A.L.R. 1435 at 1438. The annotations deal
only with the conclusiveness of legislative declarations of emergencies. A further anno-
tation covering broader ground is available at 82 L. Ed. 1244. In Australia, see the
judgments of Dixon C.J. in Commonwealth Freighters Pty Ltd. v. Sneddon, supra note
10, at 292; Breen v. Sneddon (1961), 106 C.L.R. 406 at 411 (H.C.); and W.H. Blakeley
& Co. Pty v. The Commonwealth (1953), 87 C.L.R. 501 at 520 (H.C.).
08 See American Annotations, id., especially 82 L. Ed. 1244 at 1248-50. The clearest
statement by an American court is in Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 44 S. Ct. 405 at 406
(1924) per Holmes J.:
We repeat what was stated in Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 154, 41 S. Ct. 458, 65
L. Ed. 865, 16 A.L.R. 165, as to the respect due to a declaration of this kind by
the Legislature so far as it relates to present facts. But even as to them a Court
is not at liberty to shut its eyes to an obvious mistake, when the validity of the
law depends upon the truth of what is declared.
In Australian Communist Party v. The Commonwealth (1951), 83 C.L.R. I at 222,
the Australian High Court stated:
[I]t ... is the duty of the Court in every constitutional case to be satisfied of every
fact the existence of which is necessary in law to provide a constitutional basis for
the legislation.
Furthermore, in South Australia v. The Commonwealth (1942), 65 C.L.R. 373 at 432,
that same Court was clear on the point:
The Court should treat this expression [legislative declaration of facts] of the view
of Parliament with respect. In a doubtful case it might turn the scale, the pre-
sumption being in favour of the validity of Acts rather than of invalidity. But
such a declaration cannot be regarded as conclusive.
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such as would sterilize the courts' capacity for independent judicial review.
The Supreme Court of Canada in another context has been no less jealous
to protect its responsibility to safeguard constitutional integrity. "A State...
is sovereign," said Dickson J., "and it is not for the Courts to pass upon the
policy or wisdom of legislative will."' 9 He continued:
As a broad statement of principle that is undoubtedly correct, but the general
principle must yield to the requisites of the constitution in a federal state. By it
the bounds of sovereignty are defined and supremacy circumscribed. The Courts
will not question the wisdom of enactments which, by the terms of the Canadian
Constitution are within the competence of the Legislatures, but it is the high duty
of this Court to insure that the Legislatures do not transgress the limits of their
constitutional mandate and engage in the illegal exercise of power.70
In the landmark constitutional fact case, Crowell v. Benson, the United States
Supreme Court was equally precise:
It is rather a question of the appropriate maintenance of the federal judicial power
in requiring the observance of constitutional restrictions.... In cases brought to
enforce constitutional rights, the judicial power of the United States necessarily
extends to the independent determination of all questions, both of fact and law,
necessary to the performance of that supreme function. 71
The Canadian authorities have never ruled squarely on the issue of
legislative declaration of facts. In the Board of Commerce Act Reference, the
Privy Council was faced with counsel's argument that an emergency existed
sufficient to trigger Parliament's extraordinary power. No legislative declara-
tion in the Act itself reinforced that submission, but Viscount Haldane did
say that the emergency principle "can be justified only after scrutiny sufficient
to render it clear that the circumstances are abnormal."72 Further considera-
tion was given in Fort Frances Pulp and Power Co. v. Manitoba Free Press
Co.73 Once again circumstances turned on counsel's submission of an emer-
gency and not a legislative declaration. However, Viscount Haldane did make
09 Amax Potash v. Gov't of Sask., supra note 51, at 590 (S.C.R.), 10 (D.L.R.).
70 Id.
71285 U.S. 22 at 54-56, 52 S. Ct. 285 at 294-96 (1964). The case has generated an
extremely lively controversy in the courts and academic journals very similar to the
jurisdictional fact doctrine in administrative law. See, e.g., Dickinson, Crowell v. Benson:
Judicial Review of Administrative Determinations of Questions of "Constitutional Fact"
(1932), 80 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1055; and Larson, The Doctrine of "Constitutional Fact"
(1941), 15 Temple L.Q. 185 at 208:
The real reasoning behind Crowell v. Benson is this: [Ilt is the sole prerogative
and duty of the Judiciary to keep Congress from exceeding its constitutional
powers. If, therefore, Congress' action may in effect be carried over to situations
beyond its powers just as effectively by a finding of fact ... the judicial preroga-
tive of keeping Congress' action within bounds extends to examining those findings
of fact....
Jaffe, Judicial Review: Constitutional and Jurisdictional Fact (1957), 70 Harv. L. Rev.
953. The problem has received further consideration by the U.S. Supreme Court: see
Jones v. United States, 419 U.S. 907 at 910-11, 95 S. Ct. 190 at 192 (1974); and
Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 at 100, 79 S. Ct. 1040 at 1056 (1958).
72 Supra note 6, at 200 (A.C.), 519 (D.L.R.).
73 Supra note 61.
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it clear that the judiciary could interfere with governmental judgment that
emergency measures were warranted:
But very clear evidence that the crisis had wholly passed away would be required
to justify the judiciary ... in overruling the decision of the Government that ex-
ceptional measures were still requisite.74
A legislative declaration was contained in the National Emergency
Transitional Powers Act, 194575 considered by the Privy Council in Co-
operative Committee on Japanese Canadians.70 The Act recited that an
emergency continued following the surrender of Germany and Japan such as
to require the Governor in Council to exercise certain transitional powers
during the continuance of the emergency. Counsel attacked the continuance
of the emergency on the facts, saying that no such emergency existed
justifying the sweeping interference with the normal constitutional order.
Lord Wright answered in this way:
The preamble to the Transitional Act states clearly the view of the Parliament of
the Dominion as to the necessity of imposing the powers which were exercised.
The argument under consideration invites their Lordships, on speculative grounds
alone, to overrule either the considered decision of Parliament to confer the
powers or the decision of the Governor in Council to exercise them. So to do
would be contrary to the principles laid down in Fort Frances Pulp and Power Co.
v. Manitoba Free Press and accepted by their Lordships earlier in this opinion.77
[Emphasis added.]
The clear implication is that the legislative declaration of emergency can be
overcome by proper evidence, but not by speculation. In other words, though
there is a presumption that the declaration is true, the presumption is rebut-
table by evidence7 8
The procedure adopted in the Reference re Anti-Inflation Act is worthy
of special notice because that Act contained a declaration of legislative facts
74 Id. at 706 (A.C.), 635 (D.L.R.). The statement was repeated almost verbatim
by Lord Wright in Co-operative Comm. on Japanese Canadians, supra note 38, at 101-02
(A.C.), 585-86 (D.L.R.).
75 S.C. 1945, c. 25.
76 Supra note 38.
77 Id. at 108 (A.C.), 592 (D.L.R.).
78 One discordant note in the authorities is struck in the Leasehold Reference, supra
note 61, at 126 (S.C.R.), 3 (D.L.R.). Chief Justice Rinfret required the Court to limit
its inquiry "to the statements of fact contained in the order of reference." The statement
is objectionable because it has the effect of making legislative declarations of facts in
constitutional references irrebuttable. This means that the court would be abrogating its
responsibility for independent constitutional review in cases turning on fact. The state-
ment is highly dubitante. It cuts against all the authorities: see Hogg, supra note 64, at
391-92. An American author in Note, The Presentation of Facts Underlying the Constitu-
tionality of Statutes (1936), 49 Harv. L. Rev. 631 at 634 notes that such a rule would
allow "Congress ... to lift itself by its own boots straps, and such a rule would be
unjust to the litigant already burdened with the presumption...." In Reference re Anti-
Inflation Act, supra note 5, the Court specifically considered a legislative declaration and
directed that additional factual data be included in counsel's facta. A procedure was
established for replying to the data. One is therefore driven to the conclusion that Chief
Justice Rinfret's remark does not state Canadian law: see Strayer, supra note 37, at 178;
and Hogg, op. cit., at 392.
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in the preamble. By calling for additional facts in counsel's briefs, the court
certainly made it appear that the legislature's declaration invites scrutiny or,
perhaps, fleshing out. Either way, however, it seems strange to think that a
court, willing to involve itself in factual material in this way, will pretend
that it did not notice that the legislature erred if, in the course of the court's
inquiry, it appears that the facts are indeed otherwise than as declared. Mr.
Justice Holmes' remark in Chastleton Corporation v. Sinclair seems especial-
ly pertinent in this context: "[A] court is not at liberty to shut its eyes to an
obvious mistake, when the validity of the law depends upon the truth of what
is declared. ' 79 In view of the authorities and the courts' duty to protect the
constitution by independent judicial review, one is entitled to conclude that
Canadian courts will not shrink from reviewing legislative declarations of
facts in a proper case; or, to state the point another way, the presumption of
regularity, as applied to legislative declarations of facts, is rebuttable.
If this conclusion stands, section 2 of the War Measures Act comes into
bold relief. That section provides:
EVIDENCE OF WAR
2. The issue of a proclamation by Her Majesty, or under the authority of the
Governor in Council shall be conclusive evidence that war, invasion, or insurrec-
tion, real or apprehended, exists and has existed for any period of time therein
stated, and of its continuance, until by the issue of a further proclamation it is
declared that the war, invasion or insurrection no longer exists.80
The proclamation, referred to by section 6, is the trigger for Parliament's
assumption of emergency legislative powers.
The War Measures Act authorizes the Governor in Council to make
sweeping orders and regulations relating to matters normally reserved ex-
clusively to provincial jurisdiction. The Act allows for censorship (section
3a); regulation of intra-provincial transport (section 3d) and communications
(section 3a); regulation of intra-provincial trade, production and manufacture
(section 3e); and regulation of property (section 3f). The powers are to
accrue only during war, invasion, or insurrection, real or apprehended. The
constitutional theory behind this is that the crisis colours these matters with
a national aspect in that the continuing life of the state itself is at stake.
Parliament, therefore, acquires concurrent and ultimately paramount juris-
diction.8'
The troubling feature about section 2 is that it purports to make a
legislative declaration of emergency conclusive, or irrebuttable. Thus, Parlia-
ment's extraordinary power to invade provincial jurisdiction arises by execu-
tive fiat, and, according to the clear implication of section 2, no court can
interfere. At least one court has accepted that view.82
7 9 Supra note 68, at 406.
80 R.S.C. 1970, c. W-2.81 The best explication of this theory is LeDain, Sir Lyman Duff and the Constitu-
tion (1974), 12 Osgoode Hall L.J. 261.
82 Gagnon v. The Queen, [19711 Que. C.A. 454, 47 D.L.R. (3d) 378, 14 C.R.N.S.
321. It is worthy of note that, to the author's knowledge, no western country goes so
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How can this be correct? It flies in the teeth of all the authorities and
constitutional principles explained above. It is bad enough to think that the
courts would relinquish their responsibility for constitutional review; it
becomes particularly objectionable when the legislature itself attempts to
interfere with and kill the judiciary's constitutional responsibilities. In any
event, Parliament makes a legislative declaration of real or apprehended
war or insurrection assisted by a presumption of regularity. Certainly, a
declaration that extraordinary powers are called for to protect the nation
is entitled to the highest respect, but section 2 denies the judiciary coordinate
respect; it implies that circumstances have made constitutional review too
austere for them. It attempts pro tanto a closing of the courts. In my sub-
mission, Parliament has no power to interfere with constitutional review in
this. sweeping way. It is highly offensive to the constitutional position of the
judiciary, to the principle of separation of powers,33 and to the theory of
independent constitutional review which forms the most solid foundation
upon which our federal system is grounded.
If this conclusion is correct, one of two possible results necessarily is
implied: (1) as a matter of construction, section 2 does not exclude judicial
review; or (2) section 2 itself is ultra vires.
Possibility (1) is problematic. If the declaration by the Governor in
Council is not conclusive for the courts, for whom is it conclusive? It is not
conclusive for administrative officials; they are in any case bound by Parlia-
ment's action unless or until the courts overturn such action.84 Certainly not
for the executive who made the declaration. Thus it must be conclusive for
the courts. That means that possibility (1) cannot be right. From this one
must conclude that section 2 of the War Measures Act is an unconstitutional
interference with the judiciary's responsibility to safeguard the Canadian
constitution and ultra vires Parliament.
b) Changing Facts
If the constitutional exercise of legislative power must be supported by
facts, it is not enough that the facts existed when the challenged act was
passed. They, or some other sufficient factual conditions, must continue to
exist so long as it is sought to exercise that particular power. If the facts cease
to exist, lawful exercise of the power is at an end.85 Parliament's emergency
power offers the readiest illustration. When the emergency in fact comes to
far; executive suspension of civil liberties and disruption of the normal constitutional
balance of powers is generally reviewable. Very forward-looking emergency legislation
was enacted by amendments to the German constitution, which the author described
elsewhere: Magnet, Emergency Powers and Civil Liberties (Brief prepared on request
of the Canadian Civil Liberties Association), February, 1979.
83 See Liyanage v. The Queen, [1967] 1 A.C. 259 (P.C., Ceylon).
8 4 Lessard v. Regem (1939), 67 B.R. 448 (Que. C.A.).
85 [A] statutory provision valid in its application under circumstances envisaged at
the time of its enactment can no longer have a constitutional application to differ-
ent circumstances under which it would, equally, not have been sustained had they
existed at the time of its enactment ....
per Laskin C.J.C. in Reference re Anti-Inflation Act, supra note 5, at 427 (S.C.R.), 499
(D.L.R.).
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an end, so does the constitutional use of extraordinary powers.8 6 Identical
with this is the defence power possessed by the commonwealth government
in Australia. The power expands and contracts with the facts. As explained
by Dixon J. in Andrews v. Howell:
[U]nlike some other powers its [the defence power's] application depends upon
facts, and as those facts change so may its actual operation as a power enabling
the legislature to make a particular law. ... The existence in character of hostili-
ties, or a threat of hostilities, against the Commonwealth are facts which will
determine the extent of the operation of the power.8 7
As explained above, the presumption of regularity as applied to the
original legislative declaration means that the declaration prima facie is true;
but does the presumption mean also that the facts are presumed to be true
into the future? Is there a presumption that conditions as declared by the
legislature have not changed?
There is a certain unreality about this conclusion for, if correct, it
suggests that the legislature is capable of telling the future. This consideration
struck one American court as improbable. In Chastleton Corporation v.
Sinclair, after stating that the court must look to reality even in the teeth of
a legislative declaration of fact, Mr. Justice Holmes continued: "And still
more obviously so far as this declaration looks to the future it can no more
than prophecy and is liable to be controlled by events. 8 8 If the legislature
continues to exercise the power supported by the challenged facts, ought the
court to presume that it does so constitutionally-that a sufficient factual
foundation exists? Does this not imply that the facts as originally declared
have not changed?
Such reasoning contains a considerable fallacy. The presumption of
constitutionality as applied to legislative action implies only that the legis-
lation is constitutional. As explained below, if validity of the legislation
depends on facts, the evidentiary branch of the presumption creates a prima
facie case that all necessary facts exist.s9 That does not imply, however, that
the facts declared by the legislature exist. The facts declared may be in-
adequate as a matter of law to support the challenged legislation. 0 The
86 Fort Frances Pulp and Power Co. v. Man. Free Press Co., supra note 61, at 706
(A.C.), 635 (D.L.R.). The position is the same in the United States-see Hamilton v.
Kentucky Distilleries Co. (1919), 251 U.S. 146 at 162, 64 L. Ed. 194 at 202 (Ky.,
1919); and Australia-see Australian Textiles Pty Ltd. v. The Commonwealth (1945),
71 C.L.R. 161 at 181 (H. Ct. of Aust.): "If a power applies to authorize measures only
to meet facts, the measure cannot outlast the facts as an operative law."
87 (1941), 65 C.L.R. 255 at 278 (H. Ct. of Aust.).
88 Supra note 68, at 406.
89 [11f any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it [the
challenged act], the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted
must be assumed. ....
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 at 78, 31 S. Ct. 337 at 340 (1911).
In light of recent authorities, it is now beyond doubt that that principle in Canada is the
same. The authorities are discussed infra at HIC.
D0 Mr. Justice Beetz, in the Reference re Anti-Inflation Act, supra note 5, for ex-
ample, took the view that the facts declared in the Act were insufficient to provide a
constitutional foundation for the Act.
1980]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
presumption of regularity means that the facts as declared are true, but there
is no reason why it should go further and imply that the facts declared have
not changed.
The fallacy that engenders this erroneous conclusion turns upon employ-
ing the presumption of constitutionality in a different sense altogether than a
presumption of regularity. It is employed as an evidentiary presumption of
fact. However, the presumption of fact that conditions necessary to support
the challenged Act exist does not imply that the facts declared have not
changed. Those facts, as in the Reference re Anti-Inflation Act9 1 and
Margarine Reference, 2 may never have been adequate to support the Act.
The evidentiary branch of the presumption never would have suggested them
to the Court.
The distinction between the two aspects of the presumption of consti-
tutionality is fine, but real and important. It determines what it is that the
litigant attacking legislation must overcome. If he must overcome a pre-
sumption of regularity as applied to a declaration of facts, he has a con-
siderable hurdle. He must negative, in that instance, what the legislature has
expressly affirmed. If, however, he must overcome the evidentiary presumption
that sufficient facts exist to support the challenged exercise of power, his
burden is lightened. He has the onus in that event only to build a record of
evidence. He has no facts specifically to deny, nor must he show that the
legislature was in error. The evidentiary presumption relieves the government
from proving facts supporting its legislation. It casts an onus on the attacker
to establish a sufficient evidentiary record to support his allegation of ultra
vires.
Appreciation of the distinction between a presumption of regularity and
an evidentiary presumption throws considerable light on statements made by
the Privy Council in Fort Frances Pulp and Power Co. v. Manitoba Free
Press*3 and Co-operative Committee on Japanese Canadians."4 In the former
case, Viscount Haldane noted:
The other point which arises is whether such exceptional necessity as must be
taken to have existed when the war broke out, and almost the necessity for some
period subsequent to its outbreak, continued.... [Very clear evidence that the
crisis had wholly passed away would be required to justify the judiciary ... in
overruling the decision of the Government that exceptional measures were still
required.95
The crucial point to notice is that the "clear evidence" referred to is not
evidence to rebut any legislative declaration of fact;90 it is evidence as to the
91 Id.
92 Can. Fed'n. of Agric. v. A.G. Que., [1951] A.C. 179, [1950] 4 D.L.R. 689 (P.C.).
93 Supra note 61.
04 Supra note 38.
95 Supra note 61, at 705-06 (A.C.), 635 (D.L.R.), repeated by Lord Wright in the
Japanese Canadians case, id. at 101-02 (A.C.), 585-86 (D.L.R.); and by Mr. Justice
Ritchie in Reference re Anti-Inflation Act, supra note 5, at 439 (S.C.R.), 509 (D.L.R,).
96 There was no legislative declaration of fact in Fort Frances. The point takes on
added subtlety in Japanese Canadians, for a legislative declaration is considered in that
case, but the logic of the point survives, especially in view of Lord Wright's almost
exact repetition of the legal principle enunciated by Viscount Haldane in Fort Frances.
[VOL. 18, NO. I
Presumption of Constitutionality
existence in reality of the crisis situation necessary to justify continued use of
Parliament's extraordinary power. The effect on the attacker is profound. He
has no statement by Parliament to negate. What he must do is establish such
an evidentiary record as will demonstrate that no crisis exists at the moment
of constitutional attack capable of supporting Parliament's use of extra-
ordinary power. If he fails to establish a sufficient evidentiary record, the
court presumes the existence of all facts necessary to support the challenged
exercise of legislative power.
c) Rational Basis
The rational basis doctrine in constitutional law bristles with ambiguities.
It originates in the United States in the evidentiary branch of the presumption
of constitutionality. The first and fundamental meaning of the doctrine is
relevant to the standard of proof required to sustain a constitutional attack
based on facts. The government supporting legislation need only show, by the
presumption of constitutionality or otherwise, that there is a rational basis
upon which to conclude that facts necessary to support its act exist. As
explained in Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin:
Where the legislative classification is suitably challenged, and a rational basis
therefore is predicated upon particular economic facts of a given trade or industry,
which are outside the sphere of judicial notice, such facts are properly the subject
of evidence and of findings.97
Even in American law, the words "rational basis" mean different things
to different persons. A second and third meaning grow out of language used
in Mr. Brandeis' famous brief in Muller v. Oregon:
The question is merely whether, as has been stated, you can see that the legislators
had no ground on which they could, as reasonable men, deem this legislation
appropriate to abolish or mitigate the evils believed to exist... 98
The point here is that the legislative scheme rationally must be related to a
constitutionally valid purpose.o9 This aspect has been extensively used in
Australia.100 As explained by Professor Lane:
97 293 U.S. 194 at 194, 55 S. Ct. 187 at 187 (1934).
08 208 U.S. 412, 28 S. Ct. 324 (1908) as cited in Freund, On Understanding the
Supreme Court (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1977) at 89.
99 As explained by Frankfurter, Hours of Labor and Realism in Constitutional Law
(1915-16), 29 Harv. L. Rev. 353 at 365:
[Tihe Muller case is 'epoch-making' ... because of the authoritative recognition
by the Supreme Court that the way in which Mr. Brandeis presented the case-the
support of legislation by an array of facts which established the reasonableness of
the legislative action, however it may be with its wisdom-laid down a new tech-
nique for counsel charged with the responsibility of arguing such constitutional
questions....
"O Australian Communist Party v. The Commonwealth, supra note 68, at 140 and
153; Australian Textiles Pty Ltd. v. The Commonwealth, supra note 86, at 183 per
McTiernan J.:
It is enough for present purposes to hold that the payment of the rates may reduce
the disparities. The hypothesis that the reduction of the disparities may help for-
ward the industries and in some circumstances aid their survival is a reasonable
one. I think that a connection may be shown to exist between the payment of the
rates prescribed by the Regulation and the purpose of re-establishing the members
of the forces in civil life.
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In other cases, facts would be relevant to establish that the means chosen by
Parliament are inappropriate to secure a concededly legitimate end. Thus, a State
law which prescribes a length and height for vehicles appears to be a safety regula-
tion and prima facie consistent with s. 92; the defined length and/or height, how-
ever, may not be in fact an appropriate means to secure safety on highways. 101
The third branch of the doctrine refers to the unreasonableness of a statute
which, although connected with a constitutional power, produces intolerable
interference with other constitutional protections (such as due process).102
This branch of the doctrine has been explained as follows:
The inquiry into the reasonableness of an act may then be described as a single
one, in which the court must evaluate the relative weights of the beneficial conse-
quences which would follow from upholding the statute, and the price which must
be paid for them in the form of the resulting deprivation of liberty or property. ....
Four elements in the analysis of the reasonableness of an act, though closely
interrelated, may be roughly distinguished: the conditions existing prior to the
legislation, the effectiveness of the new rule to improve them, the deprivation
resulting from the new rule, and the possibility of achieving the same benefits at
a lower price.103
This aspect of the doctrine proves appealing in cases where Bill of Rights
issues are raised in American courts.
In Canada, the rational basis doctrine was introduced as a tool for
constitutional scrutiny in Reference re Anti-Inflation Act.104 However, it is
extremely important to notice that Chief Justice Laskin and Mr. Justice Beetz
used the concept in two different senses. Mr. Justice Laskin used the rational
basis test in the second sense explained above-the legislature had to show
only that the challenged act was rationally connected to a constitutionally
valid purpose:
mhis Court would be unjustified in concluding, on the submissions in this case
and on all the material put before it, that the Parliament of Canada did not have
a rational basis for regarding the Anti-Inflation Act as a measure which, in its
judgment, was temporarily necessary to meet a situation of economic crisis im-
perilling the well-being of the people of Canada as a whole .... '0
Mr. Justice Beetz, however, explained the doctrine in the first sense detailed
above; there must be a rational basis to conclude, as a matter of fact, that
conditions justified resort to the challenged power:
We were provided with a wealth of extrinsic material the consideration of which,
it was expected, would enable us to make a finding of fact as to whether or not
inflation had reached a level which justified Parliament's reliance on its extra-
ordinary power or as to whether or not there was a rational basis for Parliament
to judge that it could rely upon that power.10 0
101 Facts in Constitutional Law, supra note 10, at 116.
102 See, e.g., Barnett, External Evidence of the Constitutionality of Statutes (1924),
58 Am. L. Rev. 88 at 94.
103 Note, The Consideration of Facts in "Due Process" Cases (1930), 30 Col. L.
Rev. 360 at 362.
1o4 Supra note 5.
105 id. at 474 (S.C.R.), 498 (D.L.R.).
106 Id. at 470 (S.C.R.), 534 (D.L.R.).
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A similar lack of accord is apparent among academic commentators who
have attempted to explicate the doctrine.'3 7
Putting to one side for the moment the different meanings clustered
together in the rational basis concept, is there any sense in which it can be
relevant to the presumption of regularity as applied to legislative declarations
of facts? Logically, the only way this could be so is if the presumption means
that the facts as declared by the legislature are adequate to support the
challenged exercise of power.
The instant point involves precise distinctions; it is helpful to keep
them plainly in view. The point does not concern whether facts may be pre-
sumed to support a challenged exercise of power, nor does it concern whether
facts declared by the legislature are presumed true. The question now con-
sidered is whether the court will presume that because the legislature has
declared the existence of certain facts, those facts are presumed to afford a
sufficient factual basis to support a challenged exercise of constitutional
power.
The Canadian authorities negative this proposition conclusively. 08 As a
matter of logic, it is hard to see that the presumption of regularity can be
applied in this way. It is the responsibility of the courts to state and apply
constitutional principle. It is hard to see how a declaration of fact by the
legislature can influence that responsibility. Factual conditions, real or pre-
sumed, have no bearing on statement of constitutional principles. Because the
legislature declares, for example, that inflation "has become a matter of
serious national concern" as it did in the Anti-Inflation Act, it does not follow
that the truth of that declaration gives the legislature a constitutional right
to enact curative measures. As Mr. Justice Beetz replied to this contention:
"The words 'a matter of serious national concern' have been emphasized. I
remain unimpressed."' 09
The presumption that all facts necessary to support a challenged exercise
of power exist, the presumption that certain declared facts are true, or lighten-
ing the standard of proof for certain facts-all of which are separate aspects
of the presumption of constitutionality doctrine-are very different things
than lightening the burden of constitutional demonstration as a matter of law.
The first set of principles consists of evidentiary matters; the second is the
inductive statement of constitutional principle and the deductive application
of constitutional principle in the circumstances. The latter is the high res-
107 Professor Buglass, in The Use of Extrinsic Evidence and the Anti-Inflation Act
Reference (1977), 9 Ottawa L. Rev. 183 at 190, thinks that the doctrine (as used by
Laskin J.) relates to both factual findings and connection to a constitutionally valid
purpose. Professor Hogg, in Proof of Facts in Constitutional Cases, supra note 64, at
396-97, explains the doctrine as a standard of proof relating to the evidentiary branch
of the presumption. The late Professor Abel (who reviews some of the American author-
ities), in The Anti-Inflation Judgment: Right Answer to the Wrong Question? (1976),
26 U. Toronto L.J. 409 at 418-19, explains the doctrine as requiring a rational connec-
tion between the act and constitutionally legitimate purposes.
108 In Can. Fed'n. of Agric. v. A.G. Que., supra note 92, the Privy Council used facts
declared in the order of reference as a lever to invalidate the challenged act.
109Supra note 5, at 466 (S.C.R.), 531 (D.L.R.).
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ponsibility of our courts. It is a matter of legal principle, not of evidence.
Accordingly, the rational basis test-whatever be its precise meaning-has no
application to the presumption of regularity.
B. Canon of Construction
The commentators jump seven different ways when explaining the precise
nature of the presumption of constitutionality, -O but all are agreed on one
point: at the minimum, the presumption creates a rule of construction. Mr.
Justice Strong has asserted:
It is our very duty to make every possible presumption in favour of such legisla-
tive acts, and to endeavour to discover a construction of the British North America
Act which would enable us to attribute an impeached statute to a due exercise of
constitutional aulthority."'
Mr. Justice Cartwright was no less precise in McKay v. The Queen:
[I]f words in a statute are fairly susceptible of two constructions of which one will
result in the statute being intra vires and the other will have the contrary result,
the former is to be adopted."12
All are agreed that the presumption of constitutionality creates a canon of
construction; but, as demonstrated by these two holdings, there is no agree-
ment on how that rule should be applied. Is it a rule of construction ap-
plicable to the B.N.A. Act, as Mr. Justice Strong held, or is it a rule of
construction relevant to the challenged act, as held by Mr. Justice Cartwright,
or is it both?
1. Construction of the B.N.A. Act
A canon of construction that strains the B.N.A. Act in the direction of a
challenged statute is a ticklish proposition. It certainly cuts against the
established momentum gathered by the "watertight compartments" theory 18
in that it makes construction of the B.N.A. Act so flexible as to allow all but
the most offensive enactments. To facilitate judicial administration of this
11D Most doubt that it exists: for example, Professor Hogg: "It cannot be said that
a presumption of constitutionality has been explicitly recognized in Canada .... " in
Constitutional Law of Canada, supra note 52, at 88; in Laskin's Canadian Constitutional
Law (4th ed. Toronto: Carswell, 1973) at 89: "Mhe so-called presumption of consti-
tutionality . .. is no more than a canon of construction"; and Abel, The Anti-Inflation
Judgment: Right Answer to the Wrong Question?, supra note 107, at 417: "[A] pre-
sumption of constitutionality ... perhaps has not been naturalized in Canada." Also
relevant is Professor Laskin's comment in "Peace, Order and Good Government Re-
Examined" in Lederman, The Courts and the Canadian Constitution (Toronto: McClel-
land & Stewart, 1971) 66 at 72, which suggests that the presumption does not apply to
exercise of Parliament's extraordinary power:
The Board is now unwilling to make any assumption in favour of the validity of
Dominion legislation for the peace, order and good government of Canada....
Ill Severn v. The Queen, [1879] 2 S.C.R. 70 at 103, 1 Cart. 414 at 447; repeated in
R. v. Snyder (1967), 61 W.W.R. 112 at 118 (Alta. S. Ct.).
112 [1965] S.C.R. 798 at 804, 53 D.L.R. (2d) 532 at 537.
113 "[W]hile the ship of state now sails on larger ventures and into foreign waters
she still retains the watertight compartments which are an essential part of her original
structure": A.G. Can. v. A.G. Ont., [1937] A.C. 326 at 354, [1937] 1 D.L.R. 673 at 684
(P.C.) [hereinafter Labour Conventions case].
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construction rule, it would be necessary to free the courts from "original
intent" approaches to constitutional interpretation. Only the elastic language
of the B.N.A. Act then would limit judicial inventiveness in construction.
This implies exclusion of archival material pertaining to the making of the
B.N.A. Act. Additionally, stare decisis would have to be attenuated in con-
stitutional litigation. That doctrine, as the constitution ages, constricts the
constitution's meaning; freedom in constitutional interpretation withers over
time under its influence.
Comparative study of constitutional law reveals that different juris-
dictions operate under different rules as to the admission of constitutional
archival material. Many of the American states admit it freely. The draftsmen
of the new Florida constitution, for example, have compiled an extensive
record with the process of constitutional interpretation specifically in view.114
The Illinois constitution, which came into force in 1970, had been considered
by 1975 in thirty-three cases. Twenty-seven of these resorted to the con-
stitutional record as a primary aid in construction.1 15
The thrust behind these examples cuts down the power of the courts.
The constitutional review jurisdiction is limited to the specific inspiration of
the constituting documents; the constitution's meaning can neither change
nor grow. However, it necessarily follows from this approach that judicial
power to strain construction of the constituting document towards supporting
the validity of challenged acts is attenuated. The construction rule flowing
from the presumption of constitutionality pales in significance before the
paramount constitutional record.
The Canadian constitutional position differs. Shortly after Confederation,
Canadian Supreme Court judges were prepared to look at "external aids...
surrounding circumstances and the history of the subject matter... ,"" ' in
construing the B.N.A. Act. However, the Privy Council early on refused to
admit archival evidence. During argument in Maher v. Town of Portland,
counsel began his answer to a question as follows: "When the Earl of
Carnarvon introduced the B.N.A. Bill-." He was stopped. James L.J. replied
icily: "We shall not be influenced by anything then said.""17 In A.G. Ont. v.
114 See generally Levinson, Interpreting State Constitutions by Resort to the Record
(1978), 6 Fla. State U. L. Rev. 567.
115 Lousin, Constitutional Intent: The Illinois Supreme Court's Use of the Record
in Interpreting the 1970 Constitution (1975), 8 John Marshall J. of Prac. and Proc. 189
at 190. See generally Antieau, Constitutional Construction: A Guide to the Principles
and their Application (1975-76), 51 Notre Dame Law. 358; Wofford, The Blinding Light:
The Uses of History in Constitutional Interpretation (1963-64), 31 U. Chi. L. Rev. 502;
Dewey, James Madison Helps Clio Interpret the Constitution (1971), 15 Am. J. of Legal
Hist. 38; and Annotation, Resort to Constitutional or Legislative Debates, Committee
Reports, Journals, Etc., as Aid in Construction of Constitution or Statute, supra note 53.
11 St. Catharines Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen (1887), 13 S.C.R. 577 at
606 per Strong J. (dissenting). See also In Re Prohibitory Liquor Laws (1895), 24
S.C.R. 170 at 231, 5 Cart. 323 at 346.
117 Wheeler, Confederation Law of Canada (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode,
1896) at 362.
1980]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
Winner,"" counsel proposed to refer to the London Resolutions which pre-
ceded passage of the B.N.A. Act. Their Lordships ruled the material inadmis-
sible.
The general rule as to non-admissibility was stated by Professor Kennedy
in 1937:
[A] complete examination of all the cases in all the courts in which have arisen
problems connected with the British North America Act discloses that, in the over-
whelming majority of them, the ratio decidendi depended on reasoning entirely
divorced from external sources or references, to which we cannot allow even a
secure position as persuasive authorities.119
These precedents have to be read against the recent Reference re The Senate.
In this unanimous judgment the Supreme Court of Canada referred directly
to the Quebec Conference of 1864 which preceded enactment of The British
North America Act, 1867. The Court held:
It is, we think, proper to consider the historical background which led to the
provision which was made in the Act for the creation of the Senate as part of the
apparatus for the enactment of federal legislation. 120
The Court then went on to consider the pre-Confederation conferences, and
the speeches of Macdonald and Brown were noted. A conclusion was drawn
as to the primary purpose for the creation of the Senate.
What synthesis can be made of these conflicting authorities? The position
would appear to be this: Original intent theories of constitutional interpre-
tation gather little strength from the constitutional record in Canada. There
are two reasons for this: (1) There is little useful material relevant to the
meaning of the B.N.A. Act; and (2) original intent approaches to consti-
tutional interpretation are foreign to our traditions and constitutional history.
In matters of construction, Canadian judges are freer than are many of their
118 Supra note 61, at 554 (A.C.), 661 (W.W.R.).
119 The British North America Act: Past and Future (1937), 15 Can. B. Rev. 393
at 394. The proposition was cited approvingly by MacDonald in an excellent and in-
fluential article, Constitutional Interpretation and Extrinsic Evidence, supra note 46, at 81.
Professor Laskin (as he then was) explained the rule as a phenomenon partly associated
with the kind of archival materials available in Canada [in Canadian Constitutional Law
(3d ed. Toronto: Carswell, 1969) at 154]:
The Confederation Debates, 1865, recording the deliberations of the members of
the Legislature of the then Province of Canada on the Quebec Resolutions contain
by and large merely generalized assessments of the division of legislative authority.
Pope's Confederation Documents (1895) add "little to our understanding of the
scope and relationship of the heads of power distributed by the B.N.A. Act. There
is no verbatim record of debate at either the Quebec Conference of 1864 or the
London Conference of 1866 but only the conclusions reached in the resolutions
and successive drafts of the proposed confederating statute.... The Courts were
left largely with their tools of logic and precedent, with contemporary or past
legislative comparisons, with such rules of construction as they chose to apply,
with dictionaries and other works of reference and, above all, with their own
particular philosophies of federalism in general and Canadian federalism in
particular.
This note is not carried forward in the 4th revised edition, an omission, in the
author's view, to be regretted.
120 (1979), 30 N.R. 271 at 282 (S.C.C.).
[VOL. 18, NO. I
Presumption of Constitutionality
American brethren to review and expand the Constitution's meaning within
the constitutional review jurisdiction.121 However, in the limited situations
where significant archival material exists, the court will consider that archival
material in order to determine the original content of the B.N.A. Act. From
that original position, the court will extend the meaning of the constitution
to conform to current conditions.' 22
Nor will the courts allow the generality of the B.N.A. Act to be nar-
rowed by any specific interpretation that Parliament or a provincial legislature
seeks to attach by legislation. In a federal Act -3 consolidating certain in-
surance statutes, a declaration was made to the effect that each of the
provinces retained exclusive legislative control over insurance companies
incorporated by it. The Privy Council was prepared to utilize that declaration
-at odds with Dominion counsel's submissions-to add weight to the Board's
rejection of those submissions. However, Sir Montague Smith was clear in
stating that the declaration by Parliament was not, and could not be,
controlling:
The declarations of the dominion parliament are not, of course, conclusive upon
the construction of the British North America Act; but when the proper construc-
tion of the language used in that Act to define the distribution of legislative
121 There are some discordant notes to be sounded along with this conclusion: see
In re The Regulation and Control of Aeronautics in Canada, [1932] A.C. 54 at 70,
[1931] 3 W.W.R. 625 at 632 (P.C.):
Inasmuch as the [B.N.A. Act] embodies a compromise under which, the original
Provinces agreed to federate, it is important to keep in mind that the presentation
of the rights of minorities was a condition on which such minorities entered into
the federation and the foundation upon which the whole structure was subsequent-
ly erected. The process of interpretation as the years go on ought not to be
allowed to dim or to whittle down the provisions of the original contract upon
which the federation was founded, nor is it legitimate that any judicial construc-
tion of the provisions of ss. 91 and 92 should impose a new and different contract
upon the federating bodies.
To the same effect are the remarks of Morin, A Constitutional Court for Canada
(1965), 43 Can. B. Rev. 545 at 551:
IT1here should be limits to the discretion of constitutional judges.... The essen-
tial raison d'9tre of federalism, in a binational country like Canada, should be to
protect the values and rights of the constituent groups and their autonomy, even
against the will of the majority group. If you introduce into the Constitution a
"principle of growth," such as that which has been developed in the United States,
and the techniques of interpretation which are corollaries of this principle, you
can have no feeling of security, at least in French Canada.
These remarks sound strange against the overwhelming weight of the Canadian
authorities, especially the recent authorities. By the Canadian cases, the B.N.A. Act is
viewed as a document of "evolving meaning, not limited to its original inspiration":
CIGOL v. Gov't of Sask., supra note 5, at 583 (S.C.R.), 475 (D.L.R.); "a living tree
capable of growth and expansion within its natural limits": Edwards v. A.G. Can.,
[1930 A.C. 124 at 136, [1929] 3 W.W.R. 479 at 489; and "a resilient instrument capable
of adaptation to changing circumstances": Reference re Anti-Inflation Act, supra note 5,
at 412 (S.C.R1), 485 (D.L.R.). See also A.G. Que. v. Blaikie (1979), 30 N.R. 225
(S.C.C.). For further authorities, see Magnet, supra note 56, at 498 n. 102.
122 A.G. Que. v. Blaikie, id.
123 40 Vict., c. 42, s. 28.
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powers is doubtful, the interpretation put upon it by the dominion parliament in
its actual legislation may properly be considered. 12 4
Furthermore, stare decisis never has played the paramount role in
Canadian constitutional law that it has in private law or in the constitutional
law of certain other jurisdictions. The Privy Council, unlike the House of
Lords, never considered itself bound by its own decisions. 2 5 In Canadian
constitutional matters, this point was underlined, and the relevance of the
doctrine especially downplayed. Thus, in the Aeronautics Reference, their
Lordships said:
Great care must therefore be taken to consider each decision in the light of the
circumstances of the case in view of which it was pronounced.... [For, u]seful
as decided cases are, it is always advisable to get back to the words of the Act
itself and to remember the object with which it was passed.120
The Supreme Court has always threatened to overrule itself or the Privy
Council in constitutional matters. Recently, it has done both.127
The truncated significance given to stare decisis dims the light on pre-
cedent and spotlights the words of the B.N.A. Act itself. Those words are
extremely general and elastic; the courts are astute to protect that elasticity,
"as far as possible to prevent too rigid declarations of the courts from inter-
fering with such elasticity as is given in the written constitution."' 28
Constitutional interpretation in Canada is not at all unlike the inter-
pretative process relevant to civil codes; it gathers strength from the flourish-
ing example of civilian interpretation in the Province of Quebec. The
generality of words exhibited by the B.N.A. Act, like the Code Civil, remains
undiminished by decisions in actual cases; the breadth of legal statement
invites doctrinal enrichment and expansion. The presumption of consti-
tutionality, applied as a canon of construction relevant to the B.N.A. Act,
is a tool capable of aiding the flexibility of constitutional interpretation. It
heightens the sensitivity of our courts to the expanding meaning of the
B.N.A. Act; a spotlight is thrown on the curial duty to control and further
that movement. The presumption of constitutionality, so conceived, is a great
source of richness and strength for our constitutional law.
2. Construction of the Challenged Act
It is well established in Canadian jurisprudence that if a challenged act
is susceptible of two constructions, one of which is defective, it will be con-
strued so as to render it intra vires. Counsel regularly makes two submissions:
124 Citizens Ins. Co. v. Parsons, supra note 13, at 116 (App. Cas.), 281 (Cart.).
125 Tooth v. Power, [1891] A.C. 284 (P.C., N.S.W.).
12 In re The Regulation and Control of Aeronautics in Canada, supra note 121, at
70 (A.C.), 632 (W.W.R.).
127 McNamara Construction (Western) Ltd. v. The Queen, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 654, 75
D.L.R. (3d) 273 (prior Supreme Court of Canada judgment overruled); Reference re
Agricultural Products Marketing Act, supra note 4 (prior Privy Council judgment over-
ruled).
128 Proprietary Articles Trade Ass'n v. A.G. Can., [1931] A.C. 310 at 317, [1931]
1 W.W.R. 552 at 554 (P.C.).
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(1) the act is ultra vires and (2) as a matter of construction the challenged
act cannot apply to the attacker's circumstances. The rule flows from the
presumption of constitutionality, as Fauteux J. explained:
There is a presumptia juris as to the existence of the bona fide intention of a
legislative body to confine itself to its own sphere and a presumption of similar
nature that general words in a statute are not intended to extend its operation
beyond the territorial authority of the Legislature. 29
Academic commentators term the phenomenon "reading down"; the wide
reach of the statute is narrowed so as to avoid offending constitutional
prohibitions. 130 Similarly, the courts will not invalidate a wide grant of power
because it might lead to abuse; legislative or administrative misconduct is
never assumed.' 5 ' More than speculation or conjecture is needed to sustain a
conclusion of constitutional incompetence. 132 As Mr. Justice Ritchie explained
in McNeil v. Nova Scotia Board of Censors:
It is true that no limitations on the authority of the Board are spelled out in the
Act and that it might be inferred that it could possibly effect some of the rights
listed by Macdonald, J.A., but having regard to the presumption of constitutional
validity to which I have already referred, it appears to me that this does not afford
justification for concluding that the purpose of the Act was directed to the in-
fringement of one or more of those rights. With the greatest respect, this conclu-
sion appears to me to involve speculation as to the intention of the Legislature
and the placing of a construction on the statute which is nowhere made manifest
by the language employed in enacting it.1 3
All of this is settled law.
C. Evidentiary Presumption of Fact
1. The Presumption in Canada: New Directions
Twelve years ago Professor McWhinney drew attention to the signifi-
cance of "more sophisticated rules and practice as to representation and
recognition of governmental parties in constitutional cases.... ." Such rules
and practice, he said, "have gone a long way... to purge Canadian con-
stitutional jurisprudence of this purely unreal conflict of governmental
129 Reference re Farm Products Marketing Act, supra note 41, at 255 (S.C.R.), 311
(D.L.R.). See also Bank of Toronto v. Lambe (1887), 12 App. Cas. 575 (P.C.); Valin
v. Langlois (1879), 5 App. Cas. 115 (P.C.); Citizens Ins. Co. v. Parsons, supra note 13;
Hodge v. The Queen (1883), 9 App. Cas. 117 (P.C.); A.G. Ont. v. A.G. Can., [1894]
A.C. 189, 5 Cart. 266 (P.C.) (argument of A.G. Ont.); and A.G. Ont. v. Reciprocal
Insurers Co., supra note 34. The most recent statement of the doctrine at this writing is
Stubbe v. P. F. Collier & Son Ltd. (1977), 74 D.L.R. (3d) 605 at 642, [1977] 3 W.W.R.
493 at 539 (B.C.S.C.). The doctrine exists as well in Australia: see generally Lane,
The Australian Federal System (Sydney: Law Book Co., 1972) at 878. See also La
Socidtd Radio-Canada v. Cordeau, unreported, June 28, 1979, at 25 (S.C.C.).
130 Lane, id. at 878; Hogg, supra note 110, at 88: "A more limited presumption of
constitutionality has been explicitly recognized in Canada as a canon of construction
which forms the basis of the 'reading down' doctrine....
131 Bank of Toronto v. Lamabe, supra note 129, at 587.
132 CIGOL v. Gov't of Sask., supra note 5, per Dickson J., dissenting.
133 (1978), 19 N.R. 570 at 606-07, 25 N.S.R. (2d) 128 at 164-65 (S.C.C.).
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sovereignties in the abstract,"1 34 but he thought that there were still problems.
Canadian constitutional law remained "un-fact-oriented." Although progress
had been made, effective fact-finding techniques still awaited acceptance by
the Supreme Court.13 5
Professor McWhinney's observation was acute and timely. His complaint
as to "un-fact-orientedness" did not fall on deaf ears; it was picked up and
developed by others.136 Then, in 1971, Mr. Justice Laskin, in the Manitoba
Egg Reference, castigated the whole course of Canadian constitutional
decision and its abstractness. His comments could not have been more severe,
or more precisely on point. They signalled a decisive change in the attitude of
the Supreme Court. He said:
The utility of the Reference as a vehicle for determining whether actual or pro-
posed legislation is competent under the allocations of power made by The B.N.A.
Act is seriously affected in the present case because there is no factual underpin-
ning for the issues that are raised by the Order of Reference. Marketing data to
illuminate those issues might have been set out in the Order itself (as was done,
for example, in the Margarine Reference [Reference re Validity of s. 5(a) of Dairy
Industry Act (Margarine Case), [1949] 1 D.L.R. 433, [1949] S.C.R. 1] or in an
agreed statement of facts, or, indeed, might have been offered to the court to
indicate the circumstances which prompted the questions addressed to it.
As it is, I know nothing of the nature of the market for eggs in Manitoba or
outside of it, nothing of the uses to which the production is put, nothing of the
numbers of producers in Manitoba, nothing of any problems that may have been
created in relation to quality, price or otherwise by the entry of out-of-province
eggs....
A knowledge of the market in Manitoba, the extent to which it is supplied by
Manitoba producers, and of the competition among them as it is reflected in
supply, quality and price, would be of assistance in determining the application of
the proposed legislative scheme. Thus, if out-of-province eggs were, to put an
example, insignificant in the Manitoba market, this would be a factor bearing on
a construction of the scheme as operative only in respect of Manitoba producers,
retailers and consumers in production, distribution and consumption in Manitoba.
Conversely, if such eggs were significant in the Manitoba market, the legislative
scheme, not being expressly confined to production, distribution and consumption
in Manitoba, could properly be regarded as directed to the out-of-province eggs.
In this respect, the issue would be one of its validity or invalidity, and not one
of construing it to be applicable only to the distribution and consumption within
the Province of eggs produced in the Province. 137
A means to ameliorate the deficiency lay close at hand-the presumption of
constitutionality. However no court applied the presumption as a presump-
tion of fact; commentators continued to doubt that the presumption had any
relation to the factual record. 38 Instead, the commentators concentrated
184 McWhinney, The New Pluralistic Federalism in Canada (1967), 2 R.J.T. 139
at 143.
135 Id.
136 See Strayer, supra note 37, at 155: "The suggestion is frequently made that
Canadian constitutional adjudication has suffered from a lack of the factual element."
137 A.G. Man. v. Man. Egg and Poultry Ass'n, supra note 6, at 704-05 (S.C.R.),
181-82 (D.L.R.).
138 See note 110, supra.
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their major lamentations on the lack of "Brandeis brief advocacy" in Canadian
constitutional litigation.
This persistent failure to perceive the relationship between the pre-
sumption of constitutionality, applied as an evidentiary presumption of fact,
and the "abstractness" of Canadian constitutional decision occurred not-
withstanding (or perhaps in spite of) the flourishing American example of
using the presumption as a presumption of fact as early as the nineteenth
century. In Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Company, Mr. Justice Van
Devanter stated:
[Ihf any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it [the chal-
lenged Act], the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted
must be assumed.139
Mr. Justice Van Devanter's formulation provided an influential lead. It was
repeated by Chief Justice Hughes in Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Bald-
win 4 O and developed by Mr. Justice Brandeis in Pacific State Box & Basket
Co. v. White.' 4' In the latter case, Mr. Justice Brandeis pointed out that the
presumption applied not only to all facts needed to invoke a constitutionally
valid exercise of power in the abstract, but that it attached as well to specific
applications of legislation to concrete facts and circumstances. He said:
IW]here the regulation is within the scope of authority legally delegated, the pre-
sumption of the existence of facts justifying its specific exercise attaches alike to
statutes, to municipal ordinances, and to orders of administrative bodies.142
That is only one line of United States authority. There are two further
senses in which the evidentiary branch of the presumption is applied in
America. In the second sense, the presumption indicates the standard of
proof that the attacker of legislation has to meet. He must present proof
beyond all reasonable doubt, as a matter of fact, that the legislation is un-
139 Supra note 89, at 78 (U.S.), 340 (S. Ct.).
14o Supra note 97, at 209 (U.S.), 192 (S. Ct.):
When the classification made by the legislature is called in question, if any state
of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, there is a presumption
of the existence of that state of facts, and one who assails the classification must
carry the burden of showing by a resort to common knowledge or other matters
which may be judicially noticed, or to other legitimate proof, that the action is
arbitrary.
141 296 U.S. 176, 56 S. Ct. 159 (1935).
142Id. at 186 (U.S.), 163 (S. Ct.). Professor Davis, in 1 Administrative Law
Treatise (2d ed. San Diego: University of San Diego, 1978) at 449, explains that prior
to enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, c. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946), as
am., the presumption applied as an evidentiary presumption attaching to all acts of ad-
ministrative agencies. The "constitutional jurisdictional fact" doctrine put forward in
Crowell v. Benson, supra note 71, had to be understood, accordingly, in light of the pre-
sumption of constitutionality. He said:
In making rules of general applicability, agencies were generally free, in absence
of special statute, to develop factual materials or not to develop them, as they saw
fit, unless a party subject to a rule attempted to rebut the presumption on judicial
review. Such freedom of agencies was understood and accepted at the time of
enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act in 1946. Nothing in the A.P.A.
changed the presumption.
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constitutional. 143 Third, the presumption is applied as relevant to the adequacy
of connection, as a matter of fact, between the curative measures stipulated
in the challenged legislation and a constitutionally valid source of power.144
It is presumed that the challenged Act is reasonably related, as a matter of
fact, to an ostensible source of power.
Professor McWhinney's challenge may not have roused the presumption
of constitutionality from its dormant posture in Canadian law. It certainly
was not applied by Canadian courts as an evidentiary presumption, and
Professor Hogg, in 1977, was undoubtedly correct in writing: "It cannot be
said that a presumption of constitutionality [in a factual sense] has been
explicitly recognized in Canada as a general principle of judicial review.' 4
Like the Taj Mahal, this statement is a great monument erected just
before the collapse of the era that it glorified. The Supreme Court of Canada
in the last two years boldly has fashioned a Canadian version of the doctrine
and has forcefully applied the presumption of constitutionality in an evi-
dentiary sense. The irrepressible conclusion from the decided cases signifies
a major transformation in Canadian constitutional law, and if (to anticipate
likely future developments) the "naturalization" of the presumption is
coupled with an entrenched or expanded Bill of Rights constitutional review,
Canada will have thrown off the dominance of the immature abstract clash of
sovereignties characterizing her constitutional jurisprudence. She will then
have taken a giant step forward as a modem federal state.
The presumption of constitutionality was first applied as an evidentiary
presumption of fact in CIGOL. Mr. Justice Dickson, in dissenting reasons,
said:
14SAdkins v. Children's Hosp. of the Dist. of Colombia, 261 U.S. 525 at 544, 43
S. Ct. 394 at 396 (1923).
This court, by an unbroken line of decisions from Chief Justice Marshall to the
present day, has steadily adhered to the rule that every possible presumption is in
favour of the validity of an act of Congress until overcome beyond rational doubt.
See also Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law
(1893), 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129 at 142-44:
The validity of the law ought not then to be questioned unless it is so obviously
repugnant to the constitution that when pointed out by the judges, all men of
sense and reflection in the community may perceive the repugnancy.... It [the
court] can only disregard the Act when those who have the right to make laws
have not merely made a mistake, but have made a very clear one,-so clear that
it is not open to rational question.
144 Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 at 547-48,
55S. Ct. 518 at 524 (1935):
Prima facie every state is entitled to enforce in its own courts its own statutes,
lawfully enacted. One who challenges that right, because of the force given to a
conflicting statute of another state by the full faith and credit clause, assumes the
burden of showing, upon some rational basis, that of the conflicting interests in-
volved those of the foreign state are superior to those of the forum.
See also Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330 at 347 n. 5, 55 S. Ct.
758 at 761-62 n. 5 (1935): "When the question is whether the Congress has properly
exercised a granted power the inquiry is whether the means adopted bear any reasonable
relation to the ostensible exertion of the power."
_
45 Supra note 110, at 88.
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Before considering in detail the legislation, one or two observations of a general
nature are warranted. This Court is sensitive to the freedom of action which must
be allowed to the Legislatures to safeguard their legitimate interests as in their
wisdom they see fit. It presumes that they have acted constitutionally. The onus
of rebutting that presumption is upon the appellant. Before the Court concludes
that the Province has transcended its constitutional powers, the evidence must be
clear and unmistakable; more than conjecture or speculation is needed to underpin
a finding of constitutional incompetence.140
The remarks were not mere obiter comments. Mr. Justice Dickson went on to
examine the evidence proved in the case. He noted that there were concurrent
findings in the courts below on the disputed issue of fact-whether the Sask-
atchewan legislation interfered with federal control over the interprovincial
trade in oil. The lower courts had found, as a fact, that the deliveries of oil
subsequent to the challenged Saskatchewan legislation continued undisturbed,
or at a slightly increased tempo. Thus there had been no interference, as a
matter of fact, with the interprovincial stream of commerce in oil. The onus
to rebut the presumption of constitutionality pertaining to the legislation had
not been discharged.
Application of the presumption of constitutionality in an evidentiary sense
was expanded by the full Court in Kruger v. The Queen. 4 7 The Court was
unanimous in making the presumption of constitutionality the basis of its
decision. The question was whether Kruger and Manuel, non-treaty Indians,
were subject to British Columbia's Wildlife Act.148 Section 88 of the federal
Indian Act' 49 applies all laws of general application in force in any province
to Indians; provincial legislatures are constitutionally incompetent to legislate
in relation to Indians directly. Accordingly, the Court had to consider whether
British Columbia's Wildlife Act was a law of general application. Two criteria
were specified: (1) the Act had to extend uniformly throughout the territory
(which it did), and (2) the Act could not, by its consequences, strike harder
at one group than another so as to impair the status or capacities of any
particular group. Kruger contended that, in cutting down Indian hunting
rights, the Wildlife Act went to Indian status and capacities in that it destroyed
the traditional Indian way of life. Therefore, the Act could not be a law of
general application relevant to Indians.
Kruger's submission raised a question of fact. Did the Wildlife Act
impair the status and capacities of Indians? Did that status and those
capacities depend, as a matter of fact, on hunting as a way of life? The unani-
mous Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Dickson, said:
The presumption is for the validity of a legislative enactment and in this case the
presumption has to mean that in the absence of evidence to the contrary the
146 Supra note 5, at 573-74 (S.C.R.), 468 (D.L.R.). The dissent was on other
grounds and did not concern application of the presumption. Mr. Justice Martland for
the majority largely agreed with Mr. Justice Dickson's statement of relevant constitu-
tional law, but disagreed about its application to the particular challenged legislation.
147 Supra note 6. Although the reasons in CIGOL, supra note 5, were delivered
after those in Kruger, CIGOL was heard first.
148 S.B.C. 1966, c. 55 as am. by S.B.C. 1971, c. 69, s. 3.
148 R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6.
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measures taken by the British Columbia Legislature were taken to maintain an
effective resource in the Province for its citizens and not to oppose the interests
of conservationists and Indians in such a way as to favour the claims of the
former. If, of course, it can be shown in future litigation that the Province has
acted in such a way as to oppose conservation and Indian claims to the detriment
of the latter-to 'preserve moose before Indians' in the words of Gordon, .A., in
R. v. ,Strongquill (1953), 105 C.C.C. 262, [1953] 2 D.L.R. 264, 8 W.W.R. (N.S.)
247-it might very well be concluded that the effect of the legislation is to cross
the line demarking laws of general application from other enactments. It would
have to be shown that the policy of such an Act was to impair the status and
capacities of Indians. Were that so, s. 88 would not operate to make the Act
applicable to Indians. But that has not been done here and in the absence of clear
evidence the Court cannot so presume ... the only question at issue is whether
the Act is a law of general application. Since that proposition has not been here
negatived, the enactment would apply to Indians ex proprio vigore.150
The crucial point to notice is that the Court squarely applied the presumption
of constitutionality to create a presumption of fact. As in Lindsley v. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co.,'15 all facts necessary to support the challenged act were
presumed. The Court here presumed that the Wildlife Act was necessary as a
matter of fact to maintain effective wildlife resources, but the Court went one
step further. It specified precisely the kind of facts that must be proved in
order to overcome the presumption, and allowed that proof of such facts
would affect the Wildlife Act's constitutionality.
In Montcalm Construction Inc. v. Minimum Wage Commission,152
Montcalm Construction, a Quebec firm, objected to the application of
Quebec's Minimum Wage Act 53 to its employees engaged in construction
work at Mirabel airport. Montcalm's submission was that the construction
project and the relevant employees were part of a federal undertaking
integrally involved in aeronautics. The principal issue, as in Kruger, turned
squarely on a question of fact. Mr. Justice Beetz underlined that point and,
in the absence of an adequate evidentiary record, applied the presumption of
constitutionality to supply the disputed facts.
The record reveals little with respect to the nature of Montcalm's business or
operation. All we know from the admissions made by the parties is that Montcalm
is a construction undertaking.... Given these circumstances, we have no choice
but to presume that Montcalm's business is that of an ordinary building contractor
subject to the conditions of work generally prevailing in the construction industry
and of which we are entitled to take cognizance in so far as they are common
knowledge. If the facts were otherwise, it was incumbent upon Montcalm to allege
and prove them.154
The significant point is that the Court here prbsumed all facts necessary to
make the Quebec Act constitutionally valid as applied to Montcalm
Construction.
The importance of this holding cannot be overestimated. Once again,
15OSupra note 6, at 112 and 117 (S.C.R.), 439-40 and 443 (D.L.R.), 382-83 and
386 (C.C.C.).
151 Supra note 89.
152 Supra note 6.
15 3 R.S.Q. 1964, c. 144.154 Supra note 6, at 11 (N.R.), 657-58 (D.L.R.).
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as in CIGOL and Kruger, the presumption of constitutionality is applied
squarely as an evidentiary presumption. The presumption here means, as a
matter of fact, that Montcalm is an ordinary contractor, and not a contractor
integrally involved in aeronautics. If Montcalm could prove affirmatively
that it was integrally involved in aeronautics, it would be part of a federal
undertaking for the purposes of the Quebec Labour Act while engaged in
construction work at Mirabel, and the result would be different. The onus
of building a factual record is on Montcalm; all turns on the facts and, in the
absence of adequate factual support for the allegation of constitutional in-
competence, the presumption of constitutionality governs the result. Further,
as in Kruger, the facts necessary to overcome the presumption are precisely
specified by the Court. Nothing could be a more stark example of the new
role and importance given by the Supreme Court to the presumption of
constitutionality.
2. Presumption of the Existence of all Necessary Facts
It seems clear that the Supreme Court conceives the evidentiary branch of
the presumption in the first American sense explained above-as a "pre-
sumption ... of factual conditions supporting the legislation."' 155 In Kruger
the Court presumed that the Wildlife Act was necessary to maintain effective
hunting resources in the province. In Montcalm Construction, the Court
presumed that Montcalm Construction was not integrally related to an aero-
nautics undertaking. Both cases illustrate the principle by which all facts
necessary to support validity will be assumed to exist.
American cases suggest a "reasonableness" limit to the presumption as
used in this way. The court will presume supporting facts that reasonably
can be conceived. 156 If it is unreasonable to suppose the existence of necessary
facts, the presumption's force is exhausted and the legislation must fall. For
example, if it were unreasonable for the court to presume that Montcalm
Construction was not integrally related to aeronautics undertakings, the
reasonableness requirement would have destroyed the presumption's operation
to create the necessary factual foundation for validity. The case would have
had a different result. Counsel who fails to amass an adequate evidentiary
record may be able to rely on the reasonableness requirement to save his
case. It seems clear, however, that this is an emergency switch to be thrown
when all else has failed.
The evidentiary branch of the presumption, so conceived, has its greatest
significance in forcing attacking counsel to build a record. 15 7 In view of the
cases already discussed, it would be perilous for attacking counsel to come
to court armed only with a briefcase full of Privy Council and Supreme Court
precedents. He had better amass all relevant facts whether the complaint
IN Borden's Farm Products, supra note 97, at 209 (U.S.), 191 (S. Ct.). See also
Note, The Presumption of Constitutionality Reconsidered (1936), 36 Colum. L. Rev.
283, where the author explains the presumption in the same way.
156 See Notes 139-40, supra.
157 Note, The Presumption of Constitutionality (1931), 31 Colum. L. Rev. 1136 at
1148:
1980]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
be ultra vires or inoperability for conflict with paramount federal legislation.
Counsel may overstuff himself on precedents, but the Court has indicated
that it will diligently count the calories. What the judges want are particulars
of the challenger's case: what are the facts? The question cannot be ignored
with impunity. If counsel refrains from presenting essential constitutional
facts, the Court will presume away his success.
It is equally true that as adequacy of the factual record becomes more
apparent, the signficance of the presumption of constitutionally greatly
diminishes. 158 The presumption operates most cogently in the absence of
facts; as the relevant facts are brought before the court, the presumption winds
down. The evidentiary branch of the presumption is not a doctrine geared to
make success on a constitutional issue any more or less difficult; it is employed
by ihe court to insure completeness and rigour in presentation of the con-
stitutional issue. Thus, the presumption is a doctrine particularly well suited
to ameliorate complaints made about the abstractness of Canadian consti-
tutional decisions. Its use in Canada at the time is especially desirable.
The "abstract clash of sovereignties" as a leading feature of Canadian
constitutional jurisprudence is doomed. The three cases discussed above
reveal the immense ground that it has given up to factual issues and a new
pragmatic spirit. Narrower constitutional rulings with all that they imply may
be expected from the Supreme Court in future. The driving force behind all
of this is the presumption of constitutionality.
3. Rational Connection
Canadian constitutional reasoning, with few exceptions, has been one-
dimensional. The courts consider a clash of governmental interests as such
interests are tested against the design of the B.N.A. Act. In the United States,
constitutional reasoning has a second dimension. Governmental sovereignty
is limited. Powers not expressly delegated to governmental authority are
reserved to the people as fundamental rights and freedoms with which no
government is competent to interfere. The courts consider the reach of
governmental power as tested against certain fundamental freedoms elabo-
rated in the American Bill of Rights. Although Canada has enacted her own
statutory Bill of Rights,159 it is fair to say that, with limited exceptions, the
But, as a means of forcing attorneys to present the complete background of a case
to the Supreme Court, and of thus protecting legislative action from judgments
of invalidity based on insufficient information, the presumption of constitutionality
has great possibilities.
See also Bikl6, Judicial Determination of Questions of Fact Affecting the Constitutional
Validity of Legislative Action (1924), 38 Harv. L. Rev. 6 at 21-22.
158 Note, The Presumption of Constitutionality Reconsidered, supra note 155, at
291-92:
The pulls of an expanded judicial notice and deference to findings based on
evidence, though contrary in one respect, have this in common: they both result
in the presence of facts before the Court, and thus reduce the sphere in which
the presumption may operate. As counsel become more alert to present the facts
upon which they rely, there will be less need for a presumption of facts.
159 The Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44.
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event has not fully added another dimension to our constitutional law or
fundamentally changed our conception of governmental power.
Because the weighing of interests in the United States must be done in
two dimensions-as between governmental sovereignties and also as between
governmental power and citizens possessing a protected area of human
spaceO--American courts have had to be much more astute in finding a
reasonable connection between challenged acts and ostensible sources of
government power. In Muller v. Oregon,161 Mr. Louis Brandeis, as counsel,
first opened the door to establishing this relation as an issue of fact. In that
great case, Mr. Brandeis used an amalgam of social science statistics compiled
by agencies and student researchers, and legislative committee reports to
establish the relationship between a woman's health and her hours of labour.
Facts of this type have been most useful in fleshing out with concrete parti-
culars disputes where the alleged constitutional defect involves invasion of
a Bill of Rights interest. Thus in United States v. Carolene Products Co.162
for example, Brandeis brief facts were highly relevant to the court in answer-
ing a complaint that a statute prohibiting interstate transportation of milk
was a denial of due process. Such data were also relevant in the great school
segregation cases, Sweatt v. Painter'63 and Brown v. Board of Education. 64
In Sweatt, Mr. Thurgood Marshall, counsel for the attackers, was especially
clear in explaining to the Court the relevance of social scientific data to his
allegation of constitutional defect. He said:
[W]e have the right to show their unconstitutionality.... There are several ways
of going about proving unconstitutionality of statutes. They haven't shown any
line of reasoning for the statutes. I imagine they are relying on the presumption
that the statutes are constitutional. If they are relying on that we have a right to
put in evidence to show that segregation statutes in the State of Texas and in any
other state, actually when examined, and they have never been examined in any
lawsuit that I know of yet, have no line of reasonableness. There is no under-
standable factual basis for classification by race, and under a long line of decisions
by the Supreme Court, not on the question of Negroes, but on the 14th Amend-
ment, all courts agree that if there is no rational basis for the classification, it is
flat in the teeth of the 14th Amendment .... "Or
There can be no doubt that the two axes-federalist disputes and Bill of
Rights disputes-are different. Conflicts over the allocation of power, as
explained above, raise issues of constitutional policy. Social science data are
not critical to informed judicial resolution, nor is there any compelling neces-
sity to examine social science data to discover whether, as a matter of con-
stitutional policy, the challenged act exhibits a rational connection to an
160 The language is that of Professor Charles Reich. See his essay, The New Prop-
erty (1964), 73 Yale L.J. 733. The concept has been exceptionally influential in the
developing American constitutional right to privacy: see, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973); and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 93 S. Ct. 739 (1973).
161 208 U.S. 412, 28 S. Ct. 324 (1908).
162 304 U.S. 144, 58 S. Ct. 778 (1938).
163 339 U.S. 629, 70 S. Ct. 848 (1950).
164 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686 (1954).
105 As quoted from the trial record in Kohn, Social Psychological Data, Legislative
Fact, and Constitutional Law (1960), 29 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 136 at 140.
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ostensible source of power. Economic data, however, certainly may be useful;
in Canada it seems clear that such evidence, where relevant, must be pro-
duced. Mr. Justice Laskin's complaint about the lack of supporting economic
data in A.G. Man. v. Manitoba Egg and Poultry Association 16 ripened into
judicial directions to supply such data in the Reference re Anti-Inflation
Act.16 The presumption of constitutionality could usefully be applied in such
cases to throw an onus on the attacker to build an adequate economic record.
Bill of Rights disputes raising broad issues of social policy differ. How-
ever, they are not (or not yet) characteristic of Canadian constitutional
law.' 68 It is helpful to underline that point, for the call for Brandeis brief
advocacy implies a wholesale restructuring of Canadian constitutional liti-
gation in point of content; it implies a shift away from federalist disputes
towards fundamental freedoms disputes. The Brandeis brief is not an end
in itself.
In saying this, one must not overlook the importance of Curr v. The
Queen.I1e Mr. Justice Laskin in that case masterfully outlined the scope of
American due process theory, but he refused to hold that compulsory
breathalyzer tests violated due process guarantees in section 1(a) of the
Canadian Bill of Rights"1 ° without proof of adequate supporting data. In
other words, the attacker was defeated by a presumption of constitutionality
for failure to bring sufficient constitutional facts before the Court.
Notwithstanding that Canadian constitutional law lacks (for the time
being) a strong Bill of Rights flavour, there is reason to conclude that the
rational connection test, in some cases, will be the chief result of applying the
presumption of constitutionality in an evidentiary sense. Mr. Justice Dickson
in Kruger suggested that the presumption required attacking counsel to
establish that the policy of the challenged act was to impair the status and
capacities of Indians. That is quite a different thing from proving that the
effect of the Act, as a matter of fact, accomplished that result. "Policy" and
"effect" are certainly not congruent. One would have thought that policy could
be established by showing a rational connection between the challenged act
and a constitutionally valid purpose. Even if the act misfired-did not have
the desired effect-the policy, if rationally connected to an ostensible source
of power, would still provide constitutional support. The presumption is that
166 Supra note 6.
167 Supra note 5.
168 A good illustration of this proposition is provided by the short shrift given by
the Supreme Court of Canada to the constitutional issue presented in Morgentaler v.
The Queen, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 616, 53 D.L.R. (3d) 161, 20 C.C.C. (2d) 449. Counsel
had prepared considerable evidence as to inequality of access to abortion; the Court
largely disregarded it. In Saumur v. City of Quebec, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299, [1953] 4
D.L.R. 641, 106 C.C.C. 289, counsel for the appellant succeeded but was denied an
award of costs for presenting Brandeis brief data in his factum. I know of no other
circumstances where this was done, but I might remark that I have read my share of
long and irrelevant facta where costs were not withheld-and this includes facta longer,
and, in my personal view, more irrelevant, than the Saumur factum.
169 [1972] S.C.R. 889, 26 D.L.R. (3d) 603, 7 C.C.C. (2d) 181.
170 S.C. 1960, c. 44.
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the act is rationally connected to a constitutionally valid purpose or source
of power.
III. OVERCOMING THE PRESUMPTION
A. Position of the Attacker
An attacker of legislation may have a factual onus of proof to discharge.
Four mechanisms are available to him to overcome the burden created by the
presumption of constitutionality. They are: (1) judicial notice, (2) proof of
fact at trial, (3) proof of fact in the appellate factum, and (4) proof by extra-
judicial specialized research agencies.
1. Judicial Notice
Counsel may invite the court to take judicial notice of relevant facts in
a variety of ways: he may present such facts in oral argument, in memoranda,
in facta or in appendices to facta. Whole books have been photocopied by
counsel and accepted by the Supreme Court of Canada as factum appendices,
but the court does not need counsel's invitation to take judicial notice of
relevant facts. It can and does conduct its own research. As Mr. Justice
Frankfurter said in argument during Briggs v. Elliott:
Can we not take judicial notice of writing by people who competently deal with
these problems? Can I not take judicial notice of Myrdal's book without having
him called as a witness? ... How to inform the judicial mind, as you know, is
one of the most complicated problems. It is better to have witnesses, but I did not
know that we could not read the works of competent writers. 171
It appears from dissenting reasons in CIGOL172 that the Supreme Court
of Canada agrees. The Court there referred to facts pertaining to the elas-
ticity of demand for oil which did not appear in the case or facta filed by
counsel. This practice dates from at least the time of Lord Mansfield. In
Lewis v. Rucker, Lord Mansfield freely acknowledged going beyond the
record for facts:
I thought a good deal of the point, and endeavoured to get what assistance I could
by conversing with some gentlemen of experience in adjustments. 173
171 Transcript of Argument in Briggs v. Elliott, No. 102, in the United States
Supreme Court, Oct. term, 1952, at 555-59, as cited in Greenberg, Social Scientists Take
the Stand: A Review and Appraisal of Their Testimony in Litigation (1956), 54 Mich.
L. Rev. 953 at 966.
172 Supra note 5. See also Note, Social and Economic Facts-Appraisal of Sug-
gested Techniques for Presenting Them to the Courts (1948), 61 Harv. L. Rev. 692 at
697:
Under the guise of judicial notice, some courts have conducted independent re-
searches on their own in order to learn social facts not so notorious and indis-
putable as to be capable of true judicial notice. They have not usually obtained
the information from the primary sources, but rather have had to resort to li-
braries, experts, government agencies, or even employees of an agency which is a
party to the case.
The author is critical of the practice. He points out that it disregards the interests
of parties to the litigation who are given no opportunity to be heard.
173 (1761), 2 Burr. 1167 at 1172, 97 E.R. 769 at 772 (K.B.). Justice Brandeis was
apparently notorious for out-researching counsel. See Note, The Presumption of Con-
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The practice may be expected to increase. Only a short while ago law journals
were not accepted as authorities before the court. Perusal of any recent
volume of the Supreme Court Reports demonstrates how far from that
position we have come.
What limits, then, are there to judicial notice as a means for bringing
facts before the Court? Can adjudicative 174 disputed facts upon which the
constitutionality of challenged legislation depends be noticed judicially? Can
facts contradicting a legislative declaration be noticed judicially?
Canadian writers who have grappled with these questions hold the view
that judicial notice properly may be taken only of facts which are:
(a) so notorious as not to be the subject of dispute among reasonable men, or
(b) capable of immediate and accurate demonstration by resorting to readily
accessible sources of information.175
The Supreme Court of Canada, in an administrative law setting, has provided
support for this proposition. In Pfizer Co. v. Deputy M.N.R. o70 an admini-
strative tribunal had to decide whether a particular substance was a tetra-
cycline derivative. Tetracycline derivatives were dutiable; non-derivatives
were not. During hearings before the Tariff Board, counsel produced evidence
as to the derivation process, but the tribunal, in its reasons, decided on the
basis of certain scientific texts not produced in evidence and not subject
therefore to scrutiny by opposing counsel or cross-examination. The Court
held that the Tariff Board Act,'7 7 which authorized the tribunal to gather
evidence other than by oath or affirmation, did not extend this far. Particu-
larly obnoxious, said the Court, was the want of opportunity to answer or
contest the disputed information. Mr. Justice Pigeon stated:
What the Board calls "the actual derivation of tetracycline or oxytetracycline" is
not like the usual meaning of words, a matter of which a court or a board exer-
stitutionality Reconsidered, supra note 166, at 290 n. 37. See also Denning, The Disci-
pline of Law (London: Butterworths, 1979) at 289.
174Adjudicative facts are to be contrasted with legislative facts according to a
famous distinction originally made by Professor Davis in 2 Administrative Law Treatise
(1st ed. St. Paul: West Pub. Co., 1958) at § 15.03. This is a refined version of the
distinction that Professor Davis first put forward in An Approach to Problems of Evi-
dence in the Administrative Process (1942), 55 Harv. L. Rev. 364; and elaborated
further in Judicial Notice (1955), 55 Colum. L. Rev. 945.
175 Hogg, supra note 64, at 394, quoting Sopinka and Lederman, The Law of Evi-
dence in Civil Cases (Toronto: Butterworths, 1974) at 374. See also Strayer, supra
note 37, at 173:
By the ordinary rules of evidence, a court can take judicial notice only of
"notorious" facts or facts of public, general knowledge. While there appears to be
a large area of discretion as to what facts the courts will judicially notice, they
have frequently limited themselves to matters of which virtually everyone would
be aware.
However, both Strayer and Hogg suggest that judicial notice has not been adequate
to presentation of legislative facts and may require modification in traditional modes of
proof.
1710 [1977] 1 S.C.R. 456, 68 D.L.R. (3d) 9.
177 R.S.C. 1970, c. T-1.
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cising judicial or quasi-judicial authority may take judicial notice. It is clearly a
question of fact to be decided on evidence and it has been the subject of evidence
by qualified expert witnesses at the hearing. The negative evidence given by appel-
lant's expert witnesses was not contradicted by respondent's experts who were
heard before the Board and questioned on the point. The two texts mentioned by
the Board were not mentioned. Counsel for the respondent did not put them
before appellant's witnesses in cross-examination as he did for other texts. In my
view, it was a grave error to rely on those texts in its decision as against the oral
evidence.' 7 8
The point made by Mr. Justice Pigeon is acute, and crucial in the
administrative law setting. Clearly, one must assume an aroused sense of
respect for the audi alteram partem rule when the tribunal purports to take
judicial notice of disputed adjudicative facts. However, three caveats are
warranted in transposing the administrative law principle to a constitutional
setting. First, in constitutional litigation the judicial notice doctrine takes a
certain colouring from the presumption of constitutionality. The court, in
sustaining legislation, does not act on strict proof of facts, but rather on
reasonable conjecture-it will presume the existence of any state of facts
necessary to support the challenged statute if reasonable to do so. There
would be an insuperable burden on the attacker (or judicial notice would be
eviscerated) if the court required complete accord on judicially noticed
adjudicative or legislative facts. Second, approximately one-third of major
constitutional issues in Canada are resolved by the reference procedure; there
is no trial at which facts may be proved by the adversary process. Judicial
notice necessarily takes on added importance as a fact-gathering device.
Third, constitutional issues that arise in private litigation oppose governmental
interests and purport to define the limits of governmental power. Thus, if a
wide ruling emerges, the court must be sufficiently sophisticated to consider
all relevant points of constitutional fact and policy. An informed and intel-
ligent constitutional review jurisdiction would be truncated if the court were
limited to factual presentations of the parties. Provincial taxing competence,
for example, ought not to depend entirely upon legislative facts adduced by
counsel before a provincial court where the narrow issue is a demand for a
few dollars in succession duties. 179
These considerations highlight the need to balance an expanded use of
judicial notice with adequate procedural safeguards for the rights of private
litigants and attorneys-general to be heard on disputed questions of fact. It is
crucial that the court robustly conceive its power to notice facts judicially;
it ought not to limit itself to facts so obvious as not to be the subject of
dispute among reasonable men. Fifteen years ago, for example, it was
so notorious as to be indisputable that full frontal nudity in the movies
or on stage was obscene. However, things change, opinions pass away; the
hardest held and felt beliefs dissolve into superstition. That is what charac-
terizes the progress of human enlightenment. The courts play an important
178 Supra note 176, at 463 (S.C.R.), 15 (D.L.R.).
179 The point is mitigated by statutory provision for notice to the provincial attorney
general and the Attorney-General of Canada when constitutional points are raised. It is
not completely answered, however, for provincial representation is by no means always
made. Rarely do all of the provinces intervene.
1980]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
dispute-settling and educative role in forming reasoned opinions. In so doing
they aid emancipation of the mind from superstition, and the steady growth
of enlightenment in the legal order. If the courts were to notice only those
facts and opinions on which all agree they would abandon that high duty.
Matters such as the social value of nude representation in art do not admit
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. If the presumption of constitutionality
requires this, it cannot be adequately overcome in a trial type setting. That
is why the constraints of judicial notice must be relaxed in constitutional
cases. The point takes on added relevance in Bill of Rights disputes.
It is crucial, however, that procedural safeguards accompany expansion
of judicial notice. Most importantly, the litigants and attorneys-general af-
fected ought to be given due notice and a fair opportunity to contradict any
facts intended to be made the subject of official notice. As long ago as 1923,
Professor Wigmore suggested that facts judicially noticed could and should
be disputed.
That a matter is judicially noticed means merely that it is taken as true without
the offering of evidence by the party who should ordinarily have done so. But the
opponent is not prevented from disputing the matter by evidence, if he believes it
disputable. It is true that occasionally a Court is found declaring a thing judicially
noticed and at the same time refusing to listen to evidence to the contrary; but
usually this is in truth laying down a new rule of substantive law by declaring
certain facts immaterial .... 180
The extent of facts properly made the subject of judicial notice will vary with
the circumstances of each case; the procedure for disputing the facts will have
to be worked out on a case-by-case basis.181 Finding the appropriate balance
between an expanded use of judicial notice and adequate procedural pro-
tections is a great and important challenge for our constitutional juris-
prudence. Certainly not all trivia in the judge's experience need to be set
forth on the record or drawn to counsel's attention. However, (1) the more
the judicially noticed facts are crucial to the constitutional issue, (2) are
disputed, and (3) are facts that the parties reasonably can develop, the more
the court ought to notify counsel and allow an opportunity to answer.182
2. Proof of Facts at Trial
Judical notice has its limits. The more complex and disputed the facts,
the less reliable is judicial notice as a means for bringing relevant facts before
the court. The court's authority and prestige is at risk if it gets too far ahead
of counsel in the fact-finding process. 18e The problem can be ameliorated by
180 5 A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common
Law (2d ed. Boston: Little, Brown, 1923) at §2567 [hereinafter Wigmore on Evidence].
181 This procedure was adopted in the Reference re Anti-Inflation Act, supra note 5,
and described in Hogg, supra note 52, at 396 ff. See also the discussion by the McRuer
Commission, 1 Inquiry into Civil Rights (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1968) at 50-51.
182 See generally Davis, Judicial Notice, supra note 174, at 983. The article is ex-
ceptionally useful and enlightening.
18 Professor Fuller put the point in this way:
[The] moral force of a judgment is at maximum if a judge decides solely on the
basis of arguments presented to him. Because if he goes beyond these he will lack
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presenting the factual issue in the trial court for resolution through the ordinary
evidentiary process. The range of constitutional issues brought before the
courts and their technical complexity is startling; the result has often been
cause for considerable optimism. In Ryan v. The Attorney General'l 4 volumi-
nous quantities of technical literature on fluoridation and its effects were con-
sidered by the Irish Court. Many expert witnesses were called and testified
at length. The trial court did an admirable job of sorting the reliable literature
from the tendentious; it did an equally admirable job of testing the experts'
credibility. The court's reasons are lucid and sophisticated; they draw
heightened attention to the trial forum as a means for proving constitutional
facts.
In Canada, it seems clear that the trial forum is available for presentation
of constitutional facts. In A.G. Can. v. Reader's Digest Association Mr.
Justice Cartwright said: "In the case at bar it will be open to the parties to
lead evidence to show the circumstances to which the impugned sections are
to be applied. ... "185 In the Bank Taxation Reference Lord Maugham went
further. The Court, he said, could require evidence; presumably the holding
extends to trial courts:
The next step in a case of difficulty will be to examine the effect of the legislation:
-. For that purpose the Court must take into account any public general knowl-
edge of which the Court would take judicial notice, and may in a proper case
require to be informed by evidence as to what the effect of the legislation will
be.'8 6
In Lower Mainland Dairy Products Board v. Turner's Dairy Limited the
Supreme Court agreed with the statement in the British Columbia Court of
Appeal that trial judges possess a wide judicial discretion to determine
whether the court should be informed by evidence of the statute's effect. Mr.
Justice Taschereau said:
In certain cases ... extraneous evidence is required to facilitate the analysis of
legislative enactments .... The true purposes and effect of legislation ... must be
considered .... 187
Notwithstanding these holdings, problems have arisen. Several Canadian
trial courts have refused to admit factual evidence bearing on the consti-
tutional issue. Extrinsic materials to show the effect of taxing legislation were
refused by the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in Cairns Construction Limited
v. Saskatchewan'"s and by both the trial court and Court of Appeal in
guidance and may not understand interests that are affected by a decision outside
the framework.
as cited in Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility (New York: Ass'n
of the Bar of New York, 1952) at 19. See also Note, The Presentation of Facts Under-
lying the Constitutionality of Statutes (1936), 49 Harv. L. Rev. 631 at 632-33; and
Denman, Comment on Trials of Fact in Constitutional Cases (1935), 21 A.B.A.J. 805.
184 Supra note 7.
185 Supra note 46, at 792 (S.C.R.), 312 (D.L.R.).
186 Supra note 35, at 130 (A.C.), 438-39 (D.L.R.).
187 [19411 S.C.R. 573 at 583, [19411 4 D.L.R. 209.
188 (1958), 16 D.L.R. (2d) 465, 27 W.W.R. 297 (Sask. C.A.), aff'd on the merits,
[1960] S.C.R. 619.
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CIGOL.1 9 One ground of appeal in the latter case squarely put the issue to
the Court. It was said that the Saskatchewan courts erred in refusing to admit
the evidence. Neither the majority nor the minority in the Supreme Court
commented on that submission. In Central Canada Potash v. Government of
Saskatchewan9" a wide variety of extrinsic materials were admitted by the
trial judge but excluded by the Court of Appeal. Complaint about the ex-
clusion was made to the Supreme Court of Canada. Once again, the Supreme
Court avoided the issue. Chief Justice Laskin said only:
I am content to proceed on the basis of these findings [admitted by the Court of
Appeal] and on an examination of the Regulations, directives and licenses in-
volved in the prorationing and price fixing scheme, without any further regard for
any of the other extrinsic evidence adduced before the trial judge.191
Chief Justice Laskin, it must be said, did try to explain away Cairns Con-
struction in his reasons in the Reference re Anti-Inflation Act. Extrinsic
materials, he argued, could be of no help in taxing disputes because the
economic evidence of the tax was irrelevant to the test for validity. 19 2
Explaining away all of the relevant case law was a formidable task; it
led the Chief Justice to this conclusion:
No general principle of admissibility or inadmissibility can or ought to be pro-
pounded by this Court, and that the questions of resort to extrinsic evidence and
what kind of extrinsic evidence may be admitted must depend on the constitu-
tional issues on which it is sought to adduce such evidence.193
One might be tempted to conclude from this that the availability of trial
procedure for the introduction of constitutional facts is uncertain in Canada.
But the trend is clear and is in the direction of wider admissibility and wider
employment of the trial procedure in bringing forward relevant constitutional
facts. Cairns Construction poses little difficulty; evidence as to the effect of
the taxation was excluded in that and similar taxing disputes because the
courts have created a legal fiction. The test for validity of provincial taxing
189 Supra note 5.
190 Supra note 5. Chief Justice Culliton of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
described what was admissible in this language in his judgment on appeal, (1977), 79
D.L.R. (3d) 203 at 217, [1977] 1 W.W.R. 489 at 504:
Evidence as to the circumstances leading up to the adoption of the Regulations
and evidence relating to the potash resources of the Province, the history of the
industry, its productive capacity, the demand for its production, the state of the
market and the economic problems which it faced, were all properly admissible.
Such evidence gave "the underpinning for the issues" as Laskin, J. (as he then
was) stated in A.G. Man. v. Manitoba Egg & Poultry Ass'n et at.... Too, such
evidence sets out the evil sought to be remedied.
191Id. at 72 (S.C.R.), 629 (D.L.R.).
192 The test for determining constitutional validity of a provincial taxing statute is
the general tendency of the tax as commonly understood. The ultimate incidence of the
tax is not relevant. See Magnet, The Constitutional Distribution of Taxation Powers in
Canada, supra note 121, at 487. However, the courts are by no means consistent on this
point. Mr. Justice Ritchie in Simpsons-Sears Ltd. v. Prov. Sec'y of N.B., supra note 21,
squarely based his reasons on the ultimate economic incidence of the taxation of pro-
motional materials considered in that case: see Magnet, op. cit., at 325.
193 Reference re Anti-Inflation Act, supra note 5, at 389 (S.C.R.), 468 (D.L.R.).
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statutes is the general tendency of the tax as commonly understood; the
actual economic incidence of the tax cannot contradict that test. The reason
why the fiction has been created is in order to enlarge provincial taxing
powers-to stretch them judicially beyond what was contemplated by the
founding fathers. Provincial revenue-generating capacity has thus been
brought into line with expanded provincial legislative responsibilities, such
that the exclusion is necessary and proper. It is a means for the court to
modernize the distribution of taxing powers, but it is a very special case. As
a general rule, the trial forum ought to be available to counsel trying to over-
come the burden created by the presumption of constitutionality.
3. Proof in Appellate Facta
Because so many important Canadian constitutional issues come before
the Court by way of references, the problems of fact-gathering at the appellate
level assume paramount importance. There is no trial; there is no adversarial
evidentiary process as understood by civil litigation practitioners. Accordingly,
methods have had to be devised for bringing constitutional facts before the
Court and for contesting disputed adjudicative facts. In the Eskimos Refer-
ence194 the Supreme Court, by order, appointed the Court's Registrar as a
tribunal before whom the parties could present all evidence deemed relevant.
Evidence was proferred and accepted from historians, social scientists, and
scholarly and official documents to elucidate the meaning of the term "Indians"
(and its possible inclusion of the Inuit) as used in the B.N.A. Act. In the
Reference re Anti-Inflation Act,19 5 pursuant to order of the court, the At-
torney-General of Canada was allowed to include extrinsic evidence in the
case while others were allowed to attach appendices to their facta. Additional
material was permitted to be filed by a specific date.19 6 This gave an op-
portunity to answer or contest disputed points. It has been remarked that the
procedure adopted in the Eskimos Reference resulted in a well informed
opinion; 1'9 7 mild disapproval has been voiced about the results of the pro-
cedure adopted in the Reference re Anti-Inflation Act.'98
Perhaps the most important development respecting presentation of
constitutional facts in the reference procedure is the complaint made by Mr.
Justice Laskin in the Manitoba Egg Reference. "The utility of the Reference,"
he said, "is seriously affected because there is no factual underpinning for
the issues. .. 199 The complaint had been made forty years earlier by Mr.
Justice Duff in the Water Powers Reference in equally strong language,200 but
Mr. Justice Laskin went further. He noted three ways in which evidence could
194 [1939] S.C.R. 104, [1939] 2 D.L.R. 417.
195 Supra note 5.
190 See Hogg, supra note 64, at 402-07.
197 Strayer, supra note 37, at 180.
108 See Hogg, supra note 64, at 405-07.
199 Supra note 6, at 704 (S.C.R.), 181 (D.L.R.).
200 [1929] S.C.R. 200 at 224 and 227, [1929] 2 D.L.R. 481 at 495 and 497. See
also Davison, The Constitutionality and Utility of Advisory Opinions (1938), 2 U.
Toronto L.J. 254 at 270.
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be brought before the Court. One of those ways included an offer of evidence by
counsel to indicate the circumstances prompting the reference. Thus, the
court is anxious to have such materials at the appellate court level, and will,
in consultation with counsel,201 devise procedures for its presentation and
rebuttal. One could hardly ask for more.
4. Specialized Research Agencies
Judicial notice, adversary trial procedures, and newly improvised ap-
pellate techniques ensure formidable fact-gathering potential in constitutional
litigation, but significant difficulties remain. Constitutional facts tend to be
specialized and highly technical; often they are politically charged. In the
Reference re Anti-Inflation Act, 2°2 for example, the Court had to understand
the significance of inflation to the national economy. In the Manitoba Egg
Reference203 the Court called for detailed facts as to production, marketing
and consumption of eggs in Canada so as to test the effect of a challenged
legislative scheme on those activities. Situations such as these involve
predictive theories and highly abstract models to appreciate the significance
of individual details. Problems of presentation multiply. Fact interpretations
may involve a choice between competing scientific theories, which is the
legitimate domain of experts.
The legislature uses a variety of specialist agencies and experts, including
its own personnel, in investigating constitutional facts prior to enactment.
Part of the documents thereby generated may be judicially noticed or included
in the appellate case or factum.204 However, suggestions have been put forward
that specialized research agencies under curial rather than legislative control
be employed in the fact-gathering process.20 5
Nevertheless it is hard to see that a permanent research agency is de-
sirable. Potential factual issues touch all fields of human knowledge, so the
agency would have to be highly expert in many areas and thus be of a large
size. However, highly technical constitutional-fact questions do not occupy
much of the Court's docket and therefore the agency would have relatively
little to do. That implies poor motivation and institutional decay. It implies,
too, great costs for relatively little benefit. It would be much better to bring
201 Professor Hogg, who acted as counsel for the Canadian Labour Congress in the
Reference re Anti-Inflation Act, notes that on the C.L.C.'s proposal to introduce extrinsic
evidence, Chief Justice Laskin, prior to giving directions for presentation and rebuttal,
met with counsel several times. See supra note 64, at 399.
2
o2 Supra note 5.
2 3 Supra note 6.
204 See, e.g., the Reference re Anti-Inflation Act, supra note 5, which involved a
government white paper on inflation.
205 See, e.g., North, "Note and Bibliography on Judicial Fact Finding," in Hall,
ed., Readings in Jurisprudence (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1938) 1138 at 1148-49;
Note, Social and Economic Facts-Appraisal of Suggested Techniques for Presenting
Them to the Courts (1948), 61 Harv. L. Rev. 692 at 700-01; and Note, The Presenta-
tion of Facts Underlying the Constitutionality of Statutes (1936), 49 Harv. L. Rev. 631
at 634 n. 25.
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directly before the court or its organs experts fresh from universities, govern-
ments, or industries.
In any event, no extra-curial research agency could hope to develop
competence in everything. At best, it could be a streamlined tribunal of fact,
sifting the work of others. However, a unit so conceived does not need
separate creation. Existing court systems, if upgraded, are adequate. Funds
could be employed better by improving, supplementing and redesigning
present structures. Research personnel could be added to the Court's library
staff and the Registrar's office. The law clerk staff could be expanded and
those having specialized competence could be assigned in-depth research
projects.20 6 That would generate a research unit of consequence.
It would make more sense to deal with fact-gathering procedures on a
case-by-case basis. The Supreme Court of Canada, pursuant to section
103 (1) (f) of the Supreme Court Act 20 7 has rule-making power with respect
to fact investigations in references. Rules could be made as necessary to
facilitate the fact-gathering process in any particular case.20 8 Experts could
be brought before the Court, a rump bench, or a court functionary20 9 in an
adversarial or inquisitorial setting. Expert reports in technical and specialist
fields could be commissioned. Experience with these and other techniques
should demonstrate whether they are adequate or whether further fact-
gathering capacity needs to be added to the Court's arsenal.
B. Position of the Government
When legislation is challenged, all facts necessary to support it will be
presumed; a regular legislative purpose and intent will be presumed and an
intra vires operation of the statute will be presumed as a matter of fact and
construction. If the case turns on one or more of these, counsel can remain
seated until the attacker has made out a sufficient case. He may rely on the
presumption of constitutionality.
However, reliance solely on the presumption is neither desirable nor
safe. Counsel would be tempting the court. As already explained, the court is
not too timid to make its own investigations and resort to judicial notice.
Though there is a general presumption of constitutionality, the court will not
206 At present, ten law clerks are employed by the Supreme Court of Canada. One
is assigned to each judge and one is assigned to the Registrar. Moreover, additional tasks
are being assigned to them. Summaries of cases used to be the responsibility of the
Chief Justice's executive assistant; in 1976 it was transferred to the law clerks.
207 R.S.C. 1970, c. S-19.
208 As was done in Re Truscott, [1967] S.C.R. 309, 62 D.L.R. (2d) 545, [1967]
2 C.C.C. 285. See Professor Hogg's discussion, supra note 64, at 393 n. 64.
209 As reported in Lane, supra note 129, at 882-83, the High Court Rules, 0. 38,
especially rr. 1-4, make provision for the High Court to appoint:
but only on application made, an independent expert to inquire into and report
on a question of fact or opinion on such matters as science, law, medicine, engi-
neering, accountancy, architecture, and the like. A party may cross-examine the
expert on his report. The report may be accepted by the parties or, if not, may
become background information for the Court.
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shut its eyes to the obvious nor shrink from diligently searching out the less
than obvious but crucial aspects of the case. Counsel for the government is
well advised to bring before the court such facts as sufficiently illustrate his
case. The presumption of constitutionality tilts the risk of failure due to
inadequate presentation towards the attacker, but the presumption does not
insure that he will lose for substandard demonstration of the factual issues.
Professor Freund has suggested an additional reason why government
counsel ought not to place undue faith in the presumption:
In the first place, it may be questioned whether the advocate arguing in favor of
the validity of a statute should take the burden of supporting it by a mass of
factual data instead of relying on the presumption of constitutionality. Is not the
government advocate who submits a Brandeis brief tempting the court to decide
the case without the benefit of the presumption-to decide it, that is, as if the
burden of sustaining the statute were upon the proponent? This objection needs
to be raised, but it seems to me that it can be answered. The presumption of
constitutionality need not be lost sight of; but even a court which relies on the
presumption in sustaining a statute does so more confidently and more comfortab-
ly if some factual foundation has been established for the validity of the law.
And I take it that it is the function of counsel not merely to provide the legal
doctrine for deciding the case his way, but to make the court feel comfortable in
doing so. 210
A prime reason behind the factual branch of the presumption is to
insure that an adequate record is presented to the courts. That is why, in
situations such as a motion to dismiss, the force of the presumption may be
attenuated considerably. Pleadings cannot adequately state factual con-
ditions.2r There may also arise cases where the government alone is in
possession of all relevant facts. Such cases may eviscerate the presumption's
force; they may even occasion reversal. The record would be built most
effectively if the government were to resist disclosure at its peril.2 12
Counsel can best satisfy the need for facts by relying on the legislature:
royal commissions, legislative declarations, committee reports, departmental
reports, commissioned studies-all of these are prime material. The legis-
lature and its organs are the most important fact-gathering force in the
country, and the government advocate should never lose sight of this as he
contemplates the advantages lent him by the presumption of constitutionality.
210 Freund, supra note 98, at 87-88.
211 See Note, The Presentation of Facts Underlying the Constitutionality of Statutes,
supra note 205, at 635:
The desirability of concretely presenting constitutional facts in evidence makes
doubtful the wisdom of rigidly applying the presumption of constitutionality when
the case arises upon a motion to dismiss. The pleader, aided by judicial notice,
must state facts sufficient to invalidate the statute, and a general averment that it
is arbitrary and unreasonable is insufficient. But, since it is well nigh impossible
to set forth in pleadings a full statement of complicated conditions, the constitu-
tionality of legislation may often be established upon an inadequate basis.
212 Reversal of the presumption has occurred in the United States although not for
the reason suggested. Legislation that classifies by racial criterion occasions reversal of
the presumption. See Kohn, Social Psychological Data, Legislative Fact, and Constitu-
tional Law (1960), 29 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 136 at 143.
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C. Standard of Proof
The evidentiary branch of the presumption may affect attacking counsel
in two ways: (1) it may create a presumption that a rational connection
exists between the challenged act and the legislature's catalogue of powers,
and (2) it may create a presumption that all facts necessary to support the
challenged exercise of power exist. The legislation will fall if either of these
presumptions can be overcome.
When attacking counsel chooses to prove that a challenged act is not
rationally connected to an ostensible source of legislative authority, he has
a heavy burden. Different considerations arise when he seeks to demonstrate
that necessary constitutional facts do not exist. The onus may differ in each
case.
1. Rational Confiection
Proof that no rational connection exists between a challenged act and
the legislature's catalogue of powers is difficult. The reason cuts to the heart
of both federal and Bill of Rights constitutional review: legislative judgment
has been exercised and the legislature has concluded that its enactment is
appropriate to further some constitutionally permissible purpose. The court,
in striking down the enactment, is squarely substituting its judgment for that
of the legislature.
The attacker must demonstrate that the legislative judgment is wholly
irrational-that the Act lacks any semblance of reasonable connection to the
constitutionally valid purpose. The key question is "whether there is a rational
basis for the governmental and legislative judgment exercised in the enact-
ment .... ,,21a To prove invalidity, the answer must be in the negative. "[The
court] can only disregard the Act," said Professor Thayer, "when those who
have the right to make laws have not merely made a mistake, but have made
a very clear one-so clear that it is not open to rational question.121 4 He
explained:
That is the standard of duty to which the courts bring legislative Acts; that is the
test which they apply,-not merely their own judgment as to constitutionality, but
their conclusion as to what judgment is permissible to another department which
the constitution has charged with the duty of making it. This rule recognizes that,
having regard to the great, complex, ever-unfolding exigencies of government,
much which will seem unconstitutional to one man, or body of men, may reason-
ably not seem so to another; that the constitution often admits of different inter-
pretations; that there is often a range of choice and judgment; that in such cases
the constitution does not impose upon the legislature any one specific opinion, but
leaves open this range of choice; and that whatever choice is rational is con-
stitutional.2 15
An example might assist. Assume the existence of a legislatively pre-
scribed length and height for vehicles pursuant to an admittedly valid safety
213 Per Laskin CJ.C. in Reference re Anti-Inflation Act, supra note 5, at 425
(S.C.R.), 497-98 (D.L.R.).
214 Supra note 143, at 144.
2 15 Id.
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regulation jurisdiction. That law may be attacked by demonstrating that its
measures are inappropriate to secure safety.2 10 Alternatively, as a matter of
constitutional policy, it might be shown that other regulatory schemes are
available, equally effective to accomplish the purpose, but less offensive to
interests of the other jurisdiction (or interests protected by a Bill of Rights).217
The presumption of constitutionality throws the onus of demonstrating
lack of rational connection on the attacker. How may that burden be
discharged?
We are dealing here in opinion-the judgment that some legislative
scheme will further some legitimate end. Professor Freund has suggested that
the attacker must demonstrate that no body of responsible opinion exists
which holds the view that the legislation will further the purpose. He said:
mhe data are offered not for the truth of the facts asserted but only to establish
that responsible persons have made the assertions and hold the opinions which
are disclosed. That is to say, the court need not decide whether, for example,
filled milk which substitutes cocoanut oil for butter fat is or is not deceptive or
detrimental to health; the court need only decide whether there is responsible
opinion that it is so. Consequently, the introduction of countervailing evidence
would be immaterial. This serves to show the almost insuperable burden placed
on the opponents of economic legislation to overcome the effect of data adduced
in support. The opponents must show that the opinion in support of the legislation
is wholly untenable.2 18
Opinions, of course, evolve. Herein lies the great merit of the rational
basis test. As responsible opinion moves away from the view that certain
legislation is "appropriate to abolish or mitigate the evils believed to exist
or apprehended,"219 constitutional support for that legislation weakens; when
opinion is set against the legislation, it collapses. Thus, in Bakke,220 one
witnesses responsible opinion abandoning the view that affirmative action
admissions programmes assist elimination of racial inequality without unduly
interfering with other Bill of Rights protections-that is as against reverse
discrimination. So too in Muller v. Oregon221 one sees the demise of any
responsible opinion that legislation restricting women's hours of labour is
necessary to protect a woman's special physical structure and health.
Legal culture rises and falls with civilization generally. It is not immune
from progress and regression in the human community, nor is it merely a
mechanical reflection of social evolution. Legal culture is a thought form and
a motive force in civilization; it enhances the status of individual dignity and
enlightenment in the world order. Constitutional law-especially the Bill of
210 The example is taken from Lane, supra note 10, at 116, where he cites Greutner
v. Everard (1960), 103 C.L.R. 177 at 189-90, [1960] A.L.R. 550 at 555-56 (H. Ct. of
Aust.).
217 Lane, id. at 117, citing Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 at
355-56, 71 S. Ct. 295 at 298-99 (1951).
218 Supra note 98, at 88. Professor Freund expresses reservations concerning this
approach, however, in the same article at 88-89.
219 The language is that of Mr. Brandeis as cited in Freund, id. at 89.
220 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978).
221 Supra note 98, at 420-21 (U.S.), 326 (S. Ct.).
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Rights constitutional review jurisdiction-catalyzes the process whereby
culture and growth in the mind inform the legal order. The rational basis
test lives in opinion and feeds on wisdom. It stands as a constant challenge to
our culture, inviting opinion to nourish and uplift our legal system-to
actualize in practical affairs the great ideals of justice current in our time.
2. Facts
Where attacking counsel's allegation is that necessary facts to support
a challenged act do not exist or have ceased to exist, his onus is different. He
is not dealing in opinion but in fact. Yet the relevant facts are often very
strange when viewed from the perspective of ordinary civil and criminal
trials. There, the issue is who did what, where and when. By contrast, the
attacking counsel in a constitutional case often deals in such facts as whether
a crisis exists sufficient to threaten the nation's continuing life, whether a
provincial regulatory scheme substantially interferes with the flow of inter-
provincial trade or whether there exists a Canadian broadcasting system
extending beyond the limits of one province or connecting any province with
another. That is not to say that constitutional facts are never narrow or
precise,222 but certain obvious constitutional facts-like the existence of an
emergency-bear remarkable resemblance to opinion.
Putting to one side for the moment the strange character of certain
constitutional facts, it is useful to ask exactly what standard of proof must be
met in order to establish constitutional facts as against the presumption.
Canadian case law supplies an answer: "[T]he evidence must be clear and
unmistakable."' 23
While a desire for precision and neatness in academic classification
tempts one to reformulate this phrase into the known categories of proof on
the probabilities or beyond a reasonable doubt,224 this is undesirable.
It is apparent what the judges are saying when they call for very clear
and unmistakable evidence. It is not clear, however, whether transposition of
civil and criminal evidence categories to a constitutional context will create
more problems than are solved. The standard in the constitutional cases is
sufficiently high so as to signal caution to the courts in interfering with the
legislature. On the whole, it seems better to let classificatory niceties lie-at
least while the courts have a workable and useful tool.
In the United States, there is an aspect of the rational basis doctrine
222 See, e.g., CIGOL, supra note 5; and Montcalm Construction v. Minimum Wage
Comm'n, supra note 6.
223 CIGOL, id. at 573 (S.C.R.), 468 (D.L.R.). See also Fort Frances Pulp and
Power Co., supra note 61, at 706 (A.C.), 635 (D.L.R.); Co-operative Comm. on Japanese
Canadians, supra note 38, at 101-02 (A.C.), 585 (D.L.R.); and Kruger, supra note 6,
at 112 and 117 (S.C.R.), 440 and 443 (D.L.R.), 383 and 386 (C.C.C.).
224 Professor Buglass takes comfort in this language: "Mhe onus on those challeng-
ing the Act would seem to be proof of its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt." See
The Use of Extrinsic Evidence and the Anti-Inflation Act Reference, supra note 107, at
190.
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relevant to the standard of proof for constitutional facts. As previously
explained,2 5 government counsel need only show, by the presumption of
constitutionality or otherwise, that there is a rational basis upon which the
legislature could have concluded that the necessary facts exist. Mr. Justice
Beetz referred to this in the Reference re Anti-Inflation Act. 2 6 The Supreme
Court of Canada employs a similar test in administrative law respecting the
leeway that a tribunal is given in finding jurisdictional facts.22
Can the rational basis standard be synchronized with the "very clear
evidence" test? It appears that it can. The rational basis standard is the
hurdle over which government counsel must get when pressed. It is especially
pertinent to those strange constitutional facts, like the existence of an
emergency, which resemble opinions. The "very clear evidence" test applies
to the attacker in all situations.
It seems that each standard can complement and amplify the meaning
of the other. Case law developments are now too slim to make profitable a
search for greater precision than that. Supposition that conflict exists between
the two standards is academic. Both tests are workable and clear; if refine-
ment is needed, the common law's great inductive method will certainly
supply it as future cases arise.
IV. CONCLUSION
Canadian constitutional law has come to the crossroads; it has taken a
decisive turn. Abstract jurisdictional conflicts want to recede into Canadian
history. The road forward leads in another direction, and promises a trans-
formation in constitutional litigation. Curial emphasis now marches toward
narrowing and crystallizing constitutional issues with relevant facts, policies,
and opinions. Chief among the techniques used to quicken this movement is
the presumption of constitutionality.
The presumption of constitutionality, especially as applied in an evi-
dentiary sense, stands as a great and constant warning to attacking counsel
concerning matters of fact. All facts relevant to support his case must be
brought before the court. Failure to do so will concentrate the presumption's
force on that issue. Counsel refrains from complete presentation of all factual
issues at his peril; all ambiguous questions of fact will be presumed in favour
of the government.
Furthermore, the government may not seek security in the presumption's
shadow to conceal relevant facts. The court has deployed impressive fact-
gathering devices and is willing to conduct its own researches. Where the
government alone is in possession of crucial facts, the presumption may be
reversed to compel presentation of those facts before the court. The end of
225 See text accompanying note 97, supra.
226 Supra note 6. See text accompanying note 106, supra.
227 See, e.g., Jacmain v. A.G. Can., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 15, 81 D.L.R. 1, 78 C.L.L.C.
13, especially per Dickson J. dissenting on another point; and C.U.P.E. v. N.B. Liquor
Comm'n, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 227, 97 D.L.R. (3d) 417.
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all this is construction of a full, useful, and concrete factual record; the means
is an evidentiary presumption of constitutionality.
Simultaneous with the heightened importance given to facts, the judiciary
has assumed an aroused sense of respect for making sound choices in matters
of policy. The constitutional review jurisdiction requires statesmanship and
sophistication in the power allocation required by federalist disputes and the
power limitation required by Bill of Rights disputes. Appreciation of the
difference between constitutional policy in constitutional review and legis-
lative policy in law-making allows the court security in policy formulation.
The limits of the curial jurisdiction assume clearer definition; the judges'
responsibility to discharge that jurisdiction stands out in bolder relief.
So too, the rational basis doctrine advances the new step of consti-
tutional law. It offers a refined and balanced means of informing constitutional
law thinking with the most civilized opinion that our culture can produce.
Constitutional law can more readily assimilate growth in the mind generally;
it can further the advance of enlightenment in the legal order. The pre-
sumption of constitutionality throws a spotlight on this process and quickens
its development.
These are immensely important developments requiring careful analysis
and nurture. Much attention herein has been concentrated on technique,
but not because the technique of the presumption of constitutionality is an
end in itself. Concentration on technique assists in breaking down the broad
issues of constitutional law while allowing the issues themselves to remain
plainly in view. "Only the exhaustive can be truly interesting," 228 said Thomas
Mann. In the present matter one may add, "and significant."
Finally, it is useful to remember that the presumption of constitutionality
doctrine is a self-effacing technique. Its greatest significance and guiding
principle lies in the push that it gives towards completeness and crystallization
of constitutional issues. As constitutional issues achieve adequacy and full-
ness in presentation, the presumption will diminish greatly in importance. It
will only have succeeded completely in its technical mission at the moment
when need for it disappears.
228 The Magic Mountain, trans. Lowe-Porter (London: Secker and Warburg, 1961)
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